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INTRODUCTION
There has been a gradual but clearly identifiable legal revolution in favor
of supporting children’s rights and promoting children’s best interests.1 Children, who were once treated more like property than humanity, and used as a
means to punish parents and channel social norms through penalties on illegitimacy,2 are now the focus of family law judicial determinations,3 the subject of
international conventions,4 and the focus of much legislative and societal concern.5 Every jurisdiction of the United States focuses on the best interests of the
child in determining custody as between formal parents and beyond.6 It is the
1

See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments from “Marginal” Cases, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6–17 (2013) (providing a historical analysis of the development of children’s rights); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80
MINN. L. REV. 267, 270 (1995); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a
World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 817,
836 (2009). See also infra Part I.A for a discussion of the progress in the law towards respecting children’s interests.
2
See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1271, 1278 (2005); Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on Children’s Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53, 53
(1991); Andrew Schepard, Kvell[ing] for Family Court Review on Its Fiftieth Birthday, 51
FAM. CT. REV. 1, 1 (2013); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1807–09 (1993).
3
See Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 703, 708 (2009); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or
Won’t Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381,
382–83 (2011); Daniel W. Shuman, Troxel v. Granville and the Boundaries of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 67, 68 (2003); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY, 313, 315 (1998).
4
See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC].
5
Atwood, supra note 3, at 382–85, 410–15.
6
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 2–4 (Nov. 2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs
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governing principle with regard to child support guidelines and litigation, adoption, placement after abuse, neglect proceedings, and emancipation.7 Internationally, many countries have ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child (“CRC”), which creates, or at least reflects, a worldwide normative insistence on the use of the best interests of the child for determining custody and
in allowing international adoptions, as well as for other legal determinations
regarding children.8 The CRC delineates numerous children’s rights and focuses on child support and the right to know one’s biological heritage and be
raised by one’s parents.9 International adoption, the use of assisted reproductive
technologies (“ART”), and many other fields of law involving children, have
all been influenced by best interests inquiries and discussions of children’s
rights.10 There are inevitable shortcomings in the application of this standard
where it may be argued that children’s interests are being ignored and are not as
influential as they appear,11 but the conceptual movement is clear and progress
has been made.
However, the question remains, how far can this emphasis on children be
extended, and, if one wants to take children’s rights and interests seriously as a
valid cause for advocacy, are there any relevant considerations in advocating
for children beyond what is determined to be best for an individual child?12 In
/best_interest.pdf (discussing that all states have statutes requiring that the child’s best interests be considered whenever a court makes decisions regarding a child).
7
See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d 1270, 1273 (1986 Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (stating that
the best interest of the child is predominant in establishing the amount of child support); Sue
Nations, Louisiana’s Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 LA. L. REV.
1057, 1084 (1990) (arguing that “providing for the best interest of the child is always the
ideal [goal] sought by child support judgments”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery,
Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard,
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 (2014).
8
CRC, supra note 4, art. 3, ¶ 1.
9
Id. arts. 6–9, 12–16, 23–28, 30–32, 40.
10
See Lisa Myers, Preserving the Best Interests of the World’s Children: Implementing the
Hague Treaty on Intercountry Adoption Through Public-Private Partnerships, 6 RUTGERS
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 780, 782 (2009) (“Without compromising the best interests of children, the
Hague Treaty struck a balance between hard-and-fast rules and flexible implementation options left to individual governments’ discretion.”); see also Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the Best Interest of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
343, 343 (2004) (discussing that international adoption legislation and practice purports to
consider the best interest of the child, specifically referring to the Hague Convention and
United Nations); Molly S. Marx, Comment, Whose Best Interests Does it Really Serve? A
Critical Examination of Romania’s Recent Self-Serving International Adoption Policies, 21
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 373, 390 (2007) (recommending the European Union suspend Romania’s admission because Romania clearly fails to consider the best interest of the child as
required by the United Nations).
11
See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 849–54
(2004).
12
See Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 518–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (Herndon, J., dissenting) (arguing that a parent’s religious affiliation is only relevant in a custody determination to the extent that it affects the best interests of the child, and here the mother’s religious
affiliation would require her to isolate her son from his father, which would not be in the
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particular, I have written a number of articles advancing the interests of caregivers and arguing for the revaluing of the caregiver role in family law.13 In
these articles, I argue for revaluing caregiving work in order to provide more
compensation and legal rights to those who care for dependents. These arguments have been critiqued for their focus on caregivers in isolation of children.14 Is giving rights to caregivers, or credence to the care work they provide,
a potential threat to children’s rights?
At first blush, it would seem that caregivers’ interests would be part of any
child-centered inquiry. Indeed, any best interests inquiry in determining custody will take into account children’s relationships with their caregivers. On the
other hand, caregiver interests may seem completely irrelevant as the children’s
rights inquiry may seem most pressing when relationships between parent and
child break down, as in neglect and abuse proceedings. However, there are
many more inquires that fall between those poles, where the issue of the severability of caregivers’ and children’s interests is central. This occurs particularly
in custody law, which is the focus of this article. I will discuss a number of examples of these hard cases in this article. One common issue of contention is
whether children should have a right to relationships with third parties other
than parents, such as grandparents, when parents object.15 In these types of custody determinations, the extent to which the court should defer to the preferences of parents in primary caregiving relationships with children, as opposed
to the many other factors involved in a best interests inquiry, is regularly dischild’s best interests); JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 11–12
(2006) [hereinafter DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS]. See generally James G. Dwyer, Parents’
Self-Determination and Children’s Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 79 (2012) [hereinafter Dwyer, Parents’
Self-Determination] (arguing that consideration of fairness to caregivers undermines the focus on children in custody disputes); Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good
Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. 489, 518–20 (1996); Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go:
Why Immigrant Reunification Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1139 1161–64 (arguing for a best interests standard in deciding when to
deport citizen children with parents and a weakening of parental rights in this context); Rachel M. Dufault, Comment, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal
Framework in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN. L. REV. 211, 237 (1991) (arguing that the
best interests standards suffers from the flaw of not allowing for altruistic choices); Lauren
C. Miele, Note, Big Love or Big Problem: Should Polygamous Relationships Be a Factor in
Determining Child Custody, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105 (2008) (arguing that because polygamy remains illegal and because it has a general negative impact upon the children involved,
it will almost always remain a factor courts can consider when awarding custody).
13
See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the
Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008) [hereinafter LauferUkeles, Selective Recognition]; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship:
Should Paid Caregivers Be Allowed to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REV.
25 (2009); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419
(2013).
14
Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 92–93.
15
See infra Part IV.A.
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puted. Indeed, that the primary caregiver presumption is not the law in any
state, but rather it is the best interests standard which dominates custody proceedings, demonstrates the potential separation inherent in custody disputes.
Relocation and modification proceedings in particular are often fraught with
confusion on how much to take into account the ongoing relationship or to focus on a renewed vision of what might be best for children.16 Finally, in the
context of education, health, and religious rights, as well as other types of parental choices, the relevance and strength of caregiver rights and the extent to
which the state should interfere, overrule, or punish parental prerogatives is often at issue.17
The pitting of children’s rights against caregiver rights is a great contemporary dilemma about the clash of rights. The clash of caregiver and children’s
rights joins a range of other dichotomies in family law that seem to create unending tension: father’s rights versus mother’s rights, parents’ rights versus
children’s rights, state interests versus family privacy, and cultural identity versus the determinations of best available care. Moreover, if a focus on caregivers
harms children’s interests and a focus on children harms caregivers then the
feminist movement for protecting the value of care seems to be potentially in
opposition to children’s rights.18 The power of this critique is that it uses the
methods of feminist theory, seeking to protect the vulnerable and to uncover
and uproot hidden power structures, to undermine the rights of the traditionally
and still predominately female caregivers who feminists have sought to protect.
To clarify, the question of caregiver rights is distinguishable from parental
rights because not all caregivers are parents and not all parents are caregivers.19
Moreover, caregiver rights refer specifically to actions of caring for children

16

See infra Part IV.C.
See Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 82–86.
18
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 70–89 (1995) (arguing for valuing the caregiving
“mothering” relationships that provide needed care for children); JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 13–39,
124 (2000) (arguing that society should reconsider the role of care by breaking down the
ideal worker paradigm that does not integrate the need to care for children); see also
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 198–208 (1989) (discussing the advent of paid childcare fostered by
women entering the workplace).
19
I largely put aside questions of parental rights versus children’s rights in this article and
instead focus on the need to include caregiver interests within the discussion of children’s
rights themselves. However, descriptions of the tension between parents’ rights and children’s are numerous. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 726 (2013); Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 525 (2014); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 638–40 (2006); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2012);
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 825.
17
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and not to parental rights to treat children at their own discretion short of a
finding of unfitness.20
Some have argued, including James G. Dwyer, that to account for children’s rights, children’s interests should be the only consideration in custody
hearings; thus, parental rights, prerogatives, and liberty interests would be
completely irrelevant.21 Because of the focus on the need to protect children, it
is argued that the state should step in and enforce children’s rights in a manner
analogous to the state’s protection of adult rights.22 Therefore, to take children’s rights seriously, it is necessary to curtail parental rights by allowing the
state to intervene and protect children’s rights based solely on objective “best
interests” criteria, as determined by the state in judicial hearings.
In this article, I explain how the separation of the interests of children from
the interests of caregivers through the use of the best interests standard is problematic and ineffectually furthers children’s interests. Rather, support for children needs to focus on supporting relationships between children and caregivers. I will argue that the use of the best interests standard to isolate children’s
interests from caregiver interests has three primary interlinking aspects that
make the standard weak and ineffectual as the primary means for advocating on
behalf of children. First, the best interests analysis protects a variety of children’s interests, such as: quasi-civil rights; liberty interests similar to, but more
limited than, adult liberties; interests in being cared for by parents or other
caregivers; and interests in protection from the state. These interests often mandate conflicting treatments and are hard to resolve by merely asking the state to
determine what is “best.” Second, due to these conflicting interests and the difficulties of predicting what is “best,” the state is nevertheless called on to decide what is best without meaningful guidance from the standard; thus, courts
rely on majoritarian values, preferring simplistic findings, such as nuclear families that are financially stable and well-educated, as opposed to the complex realities. Third, ultimately, because judicial determinations are made in a manner
that gives state perspectives and interests special weight, the needs of caregivers and the children for whom they care are too often treated as separate inquiries as courts aim to provide an individualistic and isolated perspective of best
interests in the liberal tradition.
I make this argument against the use of the best interests standard and the
separation between caregivers and children it entails, not in deference to parental rights and prerogatives because parents are better situated than the state to
20

See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the problems
that have occurred in the legal treatment of children under a parental rights doctrine.
21
Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 82–86.
22
DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 131–36 (“As a matter of rational moral
consistency, therefore, we should conclude on utilitarian grounds that in all cases in which
the state structures children’s relational lives, and in which children are not themselves in the
best position to judge where their interests lie, the state should act as proxy for the children . . . . In short, it is simply unavoidable that the state will play a decisive role in the lives
of nonautonomous persons, and it does so quite clearly today.”).
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know what is best for their children as others have argued,23 or because we
need to heed children’s own isolated interests and voices more emphatically
and in more creative ways,24 but because an individualized account of best interests that focuses on children alone fundamentally misses the nature of children’s needs and vulnerabilities, and the nature of the relationships upon which
they depend. Children are caught between dependency and agency; thus, neither pursing children’s rights through reliance on parents, nor through reliance
on a child’s own voice sufficiently captures the nature of the children’s inquiry.
Rather, to promote children’s interests the focus should be on supporting the
relationships children need to thrive.
I will argue for a conceptual rejoining of care and the caregiver and then
translate this union into applicable legal doctrine to fight the tide of separation,
the liberal emphasis on individualism, and the focus on the clash of rights in
modern family law. Instead of a focus on an individualistic best interests standard to support children, which is fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity and
subject to bias, I argue that in pursuing children’s rights, judges and legislators
should focus on supporting these caregiver-child relationships. The child and
his or her custodians have an inseparable interdependent relationship and this
relational nature of children’s lives cannot be ignored; the caregiver and the
care that a child needs cannot be completely separated.25 Moreover, these relationships that are necessitated by children’s dependency are fundamental to
children’s needs.26 Granted, when there is evidence of abuse and neglect, the
relationship between children and caregivers must be questioned and their
rights potentially terminated. However, short of abuse and neglect, the rights of
children and caregivers need to be considered in parallel, viewed as inextricably intertwined, and in a manner that protects both children and caregivers.
That does not mean that caregiver rights will always overwhelm what is
deemed best for children or vice versa; rather, the importance of the relation23

See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity
Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 358–59; Emily Buss, “Parental”
Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647–49, 656 (2002). Cf. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers
and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683 (2001) (arguing for parental
rights doctrine to maintain diverse family forms and cultural identities).
24
See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1810–41.
25
See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 14–21, 24 (1986) [hereinafter Minow, Rights for the Next
Generation]; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293,
297–98, 315 (1988); Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:” Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 894; Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon
Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political
Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 20–26 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of
Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589,
617–22 (1986).
26
Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2166–67
(2011); Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Transitional Rights, LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 21-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392570.
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ship demands consideration of how to best support children and their caregivers
in a relational and inseparable context. Sometimes caregivers will have to be
restricted or have their prerogatives overridden, but any such decision must
keep the ongoing relationship between child and potentially multiple caregivers
front and center.
This shift in focus away from an individualized account of children’s rights
versus caregiver rights, and towards a relational, relationship-based perspective
on children’s rights will significantly impact how we consider children’s rights
and the legal doctrines affecting children. In particular, I will present a relationship-centered series of legal rules for adjudicating custody decisions. I argue
for recognition and preservation of a variety of types of relationships, including
recognition of functional parenthood and third-party care, the use of presumptions to preserve relationships and to replace best interest inquires, and relocation and modification rules that reflect an emphasis on relationship preservation
and stability.
This article will proceed in four main parts. Beginning in Part I, I will dissect the nature of children’s rights and the relationship between children’s
rights and the best interests standard. This background is essential given the
confusion and conflation of the concepts of children’s rights, interests, and best
interests.
Then, in Part II, I will critique the use of the best interests standard as the
primary vehicle in modern law in advancing children’s interests. I argue that
the indeterminacy and ambiguity of the best interests analysis reflects internal
conflicts based on the different types of children’s rights comprising this standard, such as dependency rights, parental privacy, or civil liberties. Lumping
these different types of interests together creates ambiguity and uncertainty in
applying best interests that cannot be readily resolved. Thus, despite the standard’s persistence, I add to the scholarly critique that the best interests standard
is not a rich and meaningful basis for legal decision-making.27
I will then provide some examples of how best interests analyses are often
made unintelligible by differing interpretations of the meaning of children’s
rights and interests in complex legal determinations. I argue that the use of best
27

See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L.Q.
421, 426–27 (2000); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Custody Through the Eyes of the Child, 36 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 299, 300 (2011) (“[D]ue to the malleability and ambiguity of the standard,
determining best interests has proved to be dependent on factors other than a child’s needs
[including] biases of judges [and] preconceptions regarding socio-economic class, gender
and race . . . . While the best interests standard is intended to achieve that which is best for
the child concerned, it is also a broad and ambiguous concept subject to manipulation and an
unlimited number of interpretations.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert H. Mnookin, ChildCustody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (1975) (“[D]etermination of what is ‘best’ or ‘least detrimental’
for a particular child is usually indeterminate and speculative. . . . [O]ur society today lacks
any clear-cut consensus about the values to be used in determining what is ‘best’ or ‘least
detrimental.’ ”).
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interests is not an objective measure, but instead relies on majoritarian visions
of optimal care imposed by the state in an attempt to isolate what is best for
children; the state’s analysis uses simple proxies for complex analyses and undermines family privacy rights and children’s attachment to caregivers. These
examples demonstrate how current law, which attempts to isolate what is best
for children, in fact separates children’s interests from caregiver interests in a
manner that may be harmful to children and only accentuates the tension between children’s right to be raised by their parents and their right for protection
from the state.
Next, in Part III, I will consider the nature of caregiver rights and interests
and how they are indelibly intertwined with children’s rights and interests. I
will describe how such individualist perspectives on parental and children’s
rights warp and obfuscate the real issues in promoting children’s rights: supporting interdependent relationships. I will use Martha Albertson Fineman’s
vulnerability theory28 and Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational rights theory29 to argue for a theoretical framework for considering caregiver rights in tandem with
children’s rights. This relational perspective is different from a state interventionist or parental rights perspective as it focuses on the need to support relationships as opposed to giving individuals or the state power to make decisions
regarding children.
Finally, in Part IV, I will demonstrate how this altered perspective affects
legislative policy and legal decision making in the context of custody law. First,
I will argue for an approach to custody that focuses on supporting a variety of
care relationships, such as primary, secondary, formal, and functional. Children
have a right to have their supportive relationships maintained, even if primary
parents object, and differentiation and hierarchy can ease the tension and allow
different kinds of relationships to coexist. Second, I will argue from a relational
children’s rights perspective for the use of presumptions when possible to avoid
using the best interests standard. Lastly, I will consider the law of relocation
and modification, and provide principles derived from the interdependency of
children and caregivers, while focusing on supporting multiple care relationships.
I.

DISSECTING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

In this part, I will address the nature of modern advocacy for children and
its development. I will first provide a brief background on the fluctuations in
the law regarding children’s advocacy. I will then describe the nature of children’s rights, and the nature of the best interests standard.

28

See generally VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW
POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013).
29
See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011).
AND
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A. From Rights to Interests and Back Again
Children’s interests were once completely subsumed under the rights and
interests of parents. Parents were entitled to use their children for labor and collect their wages, and could punish their children harshly, even to the extent of
death in several states.30 Children were considered the property of fathers who
would retain custody as a matter of right.31 Even when custody could be awarded to either parent, the dispute concerned only the rights of two competing
adults, and children were used as a punishment or reward for parental behavior.32 Children were also used as a means to “punish” the sins of parents in laws
surrounding illegitimacy.33 Illegitimate children were historically severely discriminated against and the state justified this by the fact that the parents conceived the children out of wedlock. Illegitimate children did not have rights to
child support or inheritance, nor did they have equal access to civil rights.34
When children did not have parental care, they would be placed with foster
families, but the goal was simply to find a family to care for them and there

30

See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 314.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family,
1993 BYU L. REV. 497, 502.
32
Modern case law has since reversed the course of punishing parents by refusing to award
custody. See, e.g., Ashwell v. Ashwell, 286 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (“[I]n
determining where custody of children shall lie the courts are not engaged in a disciplinary
action to punish parents for their shortcomings as individuals”); Hayes v. Gallacher, 972
P.2d 1138, 1142 (Nev. 1999); Sims v. Sims, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (Nev. 1993) (holding custody
determinations should be made in best interests of children, not to punish parents); see also
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that purpose of custody decision is not to punish parent); Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 293, 309 (2012); Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of
the Child Standard, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 97 (2006); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60
U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1187 (1999).
33
See Taylor Gay, Comment, All in the Family: Examining Louisiana’s Faulty Birth OrderBased Discrimination, 73 LA. L. REV. 295, 303–04 (2012) (discussing how illegitimate children, born to unmarried parents, were discriminated against by the government until 1968
when the United States Supreme Court held that denying children rights based on legitimacy
is unconstitutional); see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding “it is invidious to discriminate” against illegitimate children by precluding them from recovering damages for the wrongful death of their mother); Cara C. Orr, Comment, Married to a Myth:
How Welfare Reform Violates the Constitutional Rights of Poor Single Mothers, 34 CAP. U.
L. REV. 211, 218 (2005) (reviewing discrimination based on illegitimacy and how the American legal system has historically discriminated against children born out of wedlock).
34
Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology
Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479, 483 (2005)
(reviewing the history of illegitimacy and how a child born to unwed parents had no right to
child support); see Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of
Marital and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (illegitimate children
were considered “bastards” and not entitled to inheritance rights).
31
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was little oversight over the conditions of the homes or the suitability of placement.35
The first revolution in advocacy for children was the switch from children
as property to children as interest bearers.36 Under the “fiduciary” model, children are treated as persons in need of protection. This is still consistent with a
strong view of parental rights, as a “fiduciary exercises great authority and
power.”37 Accordingly, children’s interests have become the focus of legislation, case law, and international treaties.38 Children went from being viewed as
parental property to individuals with needs and interests that need “stewardship.”39 Today, children’s interests have become relevant both in the context of
child protection—such as in cases of abusive or neglectful parents—and in resolving disputes between parents. Laws that explicitly punished parents through
custody awards are defunct,40 and almost all discrimination based on illegitimacy unconstitutional.41
Although other constitutional factors may still be considered in determining custody,42 the best interests of the child standard is dominant in custody decisions.43 Best interests analyses almost always include the relevance of children’s voices, particularly with regard to older children, but also take into
account the fact that minor children need more than mere autonomy, they must
also be taken care of. Ultimately, best interests analyses allow the state, judges,
parents, and other surrogates to determine what is best for children.
The second revolution in advocacy for children is the growing prevalence
of children’s rights. Children’s rights advocates are more focused on pitting
children’s needs against parental rights or state interests, creating a cocoon of

35

See BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 96–99 (2008) (demonstrating
harsh conditions for children in the foster care system); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE
PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 169–71 (1994) (discussing
the way children were valued for their useful labor in the foster care and adoption system).
36
See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 313–14.
37
Id. at 314.
38
See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
39
See Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1755–56; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies,
Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2493, 2519–20 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REV. 2401, 2401 (1995).
40
See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of laws that treated children as property.
41
See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state law
that barred illegitimate children from bringing wrongful death suits); but see Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001) (holding that children born out of wedlock must have paternity of
U.S. citizen legally acknowledged by age eighteen or lose ability to gain U.S. citizenship).
42
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43
See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making
About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 911 (2003); infra Part II.A.
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protection that belongs to children alone.44 Stewardship, as a conceptual model
in which parents make decisions on behalf of children, is called into question.
Those who focus on promoting children’s rights as human rights tend to be
more focused on listening to children’s voices than on allowing others to make
decisions on their behalf.45 However, because children cannot always articulate
their own liberty interests and their immaturity compromises their autonomy,
typical rights language, which usually focuses on individual autonomy and rationality, is a difficult fit for children.46 Nonetheless, rights need not depend on
full autonomy.47 The state can protect children’s rights, and parents and other
adults can respect those rights, even if children are not fully autonomous.48
Children’s rights advocates focus on how children—without full liberty and
constitutional rights—still maintain human, civil, and constitutional rights that
deserve to be protected from interference.
The source of such rights may be based on ethical notions of human and
civil rights, international conventions, or domestic constitutions.49 Indeed, children’s rights are canonized in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”), which many countries have signed.50 However, despite the name of
the document, there are disagreements on how rights-oriented versus bestinterests-oriented the CRC is in reality.51
“Rights talk” regarding children is quite widespread in child advocacy literature.52 Although it is often criticized as creating unnecessary tension,53 most
44

See, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1867–71 (1987).
45
See, e.g., Shulamit Almog & Ariel L. Bendor, The UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child Meets the American Constitution: Towards a Supreme Law of the World, 11 INT’L J.
CHILD. RTS. 273, 277–79 (2004).
46
See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 644–56.
47
See Minow, supra note 44, at 1882–1891 (“Autonomy, then, is not a precondition for any
individual’s exercise of rights. The only precondition is that the community is willing to allow the individual to make claims and to participate in the shifting of boundaries.”).
48
Id.
49
For different moral approaches to the source of rights, see infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
50
See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
51
See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kathryn A. Johnson, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Empowering Parents to Protect Their Children’s Rights,
in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? 7–18 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington,
eds., 2009) (arguing that the treatise incorporates parental rights and best interests in a manner that makes it unthreatening to parental rights advocates); Almog & Bender, supra note
45, at 277 (arguing that the CRC grants rights to children that frequently conflict with both
parental rights and judicial discretion, focusing on the rights of the child attached from parent or state).
52
See, e.g., Minow, supra note 44, at 1868–69 (“Advocates for children typically make
claims about children’s rights, despite prevailing rules of parental and judicial discretion, in
an effort to challenge public complacency and to yield particular results in particular cases.”).
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believe it is necessary to counteract strong notions of parental rights by arguing
that children deserve the same level of protection.54 Largely due to this perceived tension between parental rights and children’s rights, and the resulting
threat to the former,55 the United States has not signed the CRC.56 Accordingly,
children’s rights talk in U.S. case law is relatively uncommon when compared
to other countries. Although balancing rights is a common phenomenon, many
believe a discussion of children’s rights is inappropriate and an unjustifiable
intrusion on parental rights.57
The terms “best interests,” “children’s interests,” and “children’s rights”
are thrown around with abandon. Using the term “rights” as opposed to “interests” is often viewed as a strategic choice in order to combat the strength of parental rights rather than a factual distinction.58 Legal scholars and judges move
swiftly from one to the other. However, there are real and important differences
between the terms. Joseph Raz described the relationship between rights and
interests: “ ‘X has a right’ if and only if . . . an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”59 Interests reflect general advocacy on behalf of children’s well-being. One
can have a desire that is not really in one’s interests (does not promote their
well-being), although that may be a paternalistic perspective. A child has an interest in having his voice heard, but his voiced desires may not support his interests; thus, the state or a parent must step in to make decisions on the child’s
53

See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1841–43 (“Rights talk, when repeated often
enough in connection with the power of parents over children, has the potential to undermine
a generist perspective on adult authority. It keeps neighbors and even family at arm’s length,
excuses the community from accepting real responsibility for the plight of ‘other people’s
children’ ” (quoting W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: HOW
AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 78–85 (1982))).
54
See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Are You My Mother?”: Conceptualizing Children’s Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 109
(1995) (“Wary as I am of the destructive potential of ‘rights talk,’ I have chosen in other
writings to consciously adopt a discourse of ‘needs-based rights’ to describe children’s socalled interests. I do so because of my conclusion that, in a rights-oriented legal culture,
children need more than the weak reed of a claim to ‘interests’ if they are to make their
needs and voices heard.”).
55
See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 315 (“The provision of human rights is not a zero sum
game; acknowledging that children have human rights serves to strengthen, rather than to
diminish, the human rights of their parents.”).
56
Id. at 313.
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 12–13; Annette Ruth Appell,
Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 153 (2004);
Minow, supra note 44, at 1867 (discussing various ways rights talk is used and pointing to
an aspirations incentive to use “rights talk” even after rights claims have failed).
59
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166 (1986); accord Alon Harel, Theories of
Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 192
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); Alon Harel, Whose Home Is It?
Reflections on the Palestinians’ Interest in Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L., 333, 339–
40 (2004).
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behalf. Although we allow adults to follow their own autonomous desires, we
are more cautious when it comes to children due to their immaturity.
A right is a tool for achieving interests. When an interest is so weighty as
to create a duty in others, it is a protected interest that becomes a right. Thus,
the rights discourse should be preserved for actual rights that, by definition, require a strong interest and an interest holder. However, rights should not be
used to protect all of children’s potential interests; rather, rights should encompass a small core of interests that have clear sources—constitutional, ethical, or
based on international treaties.
People disagree on what promotes children’s interests, and some amount of
experimentation may be necessary and justified. However, children’s rights
create a necessary protective zone that must be upheld unless a rare and compelling reason exists to outweigh such rights. Encompassing rights within the
broader concept of interests weakens the power of children’s rights and prevents advocates from pursuing interests in a variety of coherent ways according
to the circumstances. Therefore, children would benefit from a more differentiated use of both rights and interests.
I will use both “interests” and “rights” in this article as tools to promote
child advocacy; however, although I am stuck with the mixed and complex uses of these terms in the literature and
FIG. 1: COMPONENTS OF CHILD ADVOCACY
case law, and thus I will continue to
use them in flexible ways, ideally
these terms connote different concepts and are not completely interchangeable.60 However, the term
“rights” can be used to refer both to
the rights it denotes and to the related
interests that support them.61 Therefore, in the following discussion of
different categories of rights, one
must understand that there is a broad
range of interests to support each
right. In the next part, I will analyze
the different components of children’s rights and interests and then
discuss the use of the best interests
standard.

60
This conflation of rights and interests undoubtedly causes confusion, so I will do my best
to be clear in the context of this article. But, as I am often dependent on others’ use of the
terms, and for the sake of simplicity, they will have to be understood somewhat fluidly and
flexibly despite the different definitions I argue that we should attribute to these terms.
61
See Figure 1 for a pictorial depiction of the relationship between children’s rights, children’s interests, and state and parental interests.

15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX

4/1/2015 4:06 PM

250

[Vol. 15:236

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

B. The Three Categories of Children’s Rights: Quasi-Civil Rights, the Right
to Familial Privacy, and the Right to Adequate Care
The term “children’s rights” is used in a variety of ways, based on a variety of sources,62 and stands for substantively different kinds of rights. First, children have two kinds of rights that can be at odds with each other: civil rights
and dependency rights.63 What Annette Appell terms “quasi-civil rights” are
freedoms from state or parental interference, such as rights of reproduction,
marriage, citizenship, privacy, cultural identity, and so forth.64 These rights are
“quasi” because they mirror adult civil rights, but are much narrower and more
limited.65 Dependency rights are the rights to be cared for by the state or by
parents, the right to be parented and cared for and to have one’s basic needs fulfilled.66 These rights are specific to children, who are in need of care. These
rights involve the freedom from abuse and neglect and the social welfare of
children. However, they have little to do with freedoms and liberty.67 Thus,
there is tension in the notion of children’s rights when referring to their dependency and need for care and their limited liberty rights.68
These so-called “dependency rights” can be further divided into two subcategories: the right to be parented by one’s own legal parents in the form of
familial privacy, and the right to state protection as a means of assuring adequate care for children.69 These different dependency interests should not be
lumped together as they can conflict. The first set of rights is based on the belief that children’s care is best provided by parents; thus, children have a right
to such care without interference from the state. The second set of rights is
based on the need for state interference with parental relationships to protect
children or to care for children when parents are not willing or able to provide
the necessary care.
All three categories of children’s rights assume different primary voices in
any resulting conflict and different actors in assuring children’s rights. In the
case of quasi-civil rights, the child is the primary actor seeking liberty rights
from the state and parents are either not involved, involved only in supporting
the child in achieving those rights,70 or involved as antagonists from whom the
62

See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
Appell, supra note 58, at 150–61.
64
Id. at 154–56.
65
Id. at 154.
66
Id. at 156–60.
67
Id. at 156.
68
Id. at 160–61.
69
Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 18–19.
70
For instance, parents might support children’s right to vote and right to citizenship,
among other quasi-civil rights obtained from the state. Children’s rights vis-à-vis the state
can also benefit parents’ rights. See Jonathan Todres, Women’s Rights and Children’s
Rights: A Partnership with Benefits for Both, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 603, 612–16
(2004).
63
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child is seeking to effectuate his rights to freedom from parental control.71 For
instance, quasi-civil rights that provide liberty from parents are emancipation
through the courts,72 the right to abortion,73 the right to marry,74 and the right of
children to have their voices heard in custody disputes.75 Indeed, because parental consent may often vitiate the need to seek redress of civil rights from the
state, parental opposition is not uncommon in these cases.76 A child may also
seek the right to vote, to drink alcohol, to receive legal representation or juvenile treatment in criminal matters, to forego parental consent laws, or to access
medical or genetic birth parentage information in a matter that is either uncontested by or unknown to formal parents.77 These are usually rights exercised by
older children who have the capacity and autonomy to pursue the liberty interests that support them. The CRC specifies a number of these quasi-civil rights,
including the right to identity,78 the right to a nationality,79 the freedom of expression, and the right to receive information.80
Quasi-civil rights may implicate dependency rights as well, particularly
when such rights may provide freedom from parental control. However, despite
the potential for overlap, they can still be distinguished because quasi-civil
71

See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (holding that a minor seeking an
abortion must have consent from either a parent or the state, but that a parent cannot have a
veto on a child’s right to an abortion without the potential for a state override); Moe v.
Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding a law that required parental consent for minor to marry constitutional).
72
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7120 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150b
(West 2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 371 (2014). See generally Carol Sanger & Eleanor
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH J.L.
REFORM 239 (1992).
73
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
74
See, e.g., Moe, 669 F.2d at 68 (minor seeking the right to marry without parental consent
but the court upholding the constitutionality of parental consent to marriage laws).
75
See CRC, supra note 4, art. 12 (identifying the right of children who are capable of identifying their own views to express these views in matters affecting them, either directly or
through a representative); Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1753.
76
J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who
Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J.
61, 173–74 (2003) (discussing the traumatic experience of minors who have to face parental
opposition to their abortion in court); Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Note, Where Privacy
Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 604
(1993) (discussing how parental opposition to abortion has contributed to late term abortions
as some minors seek redress through the courts).
77
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that where a child faces a loss of liberty he or she
must be afforded appropriate due process protections, including the right to counsel);
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 2–3 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing provisions that preclude children’s rights including the right “to vote, hold public office, work in various occupations, drive a car, buy liquor, or be sold certain kinds of reading material.” (footnotes
omitted)).
78
CRC, supra note 4, art. 8.
79
Id.
80
Id. art. 13.
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rights do not concern the need for care from others, although they could involve
procedural rights in the process of determining care, such as having a voice in
custody disputes.81
Children also have the right to parental care and parents have a duty to
provide this care.82 Parents have the corresponding right to privacy to raise
their children free from state interference.83 Thus, cases such as Wisconsin v.
Yoder84 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,85 which announce the doctrine of parental and family privacy, may also be used as examples of cases that promote
children’s right to parental care.86 Parental privacy rights were not initially developed to oppose children’s rights, though this is how they are commonly positioned in modern times.87 Rather, they developed to oppose state interference
with a child’s right to be raised by his or her parents without the state interfering or claiming rights over children.88 Children’s rights also concern protection
from state intrusion.89 These privacy cases are part of the movement for children’s rights because they allow a diversity of child upbringings.90 This line of
thinking about children’s rights is also represented in the CRC. In Article 5, the
CRC provides: “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”91 Additionally, Article 7 continues by explaining that every child has “the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.”92 In Article 14, the CRC states
that “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when
applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of
81

See, e.g., Tari Eitzen, A Child’s Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody
Dispute, 19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 60–65 (1985) (arguing that, in custody disputes, independent legal
counsel for minors ensures that their interests are protected); see also Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just and
Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 827–30 (1999) (discussing the need to focus on children’s voices in custody disputes based on a best interests analysis).
82
See Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1818–27.
83
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that “[t]he liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
84
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish children to avoid compulsory
schooling requirements).
85
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (allowing children to be educated in a
manner other than public schools).
86
See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 19.
87
See discussion of relationship between parental rights and children’s interests infra Part
II.B.
88
See, e.g., WOODHOUSE, supra note 35, at 63 (discussing the rights of children to parental
care having been brought to the United States as indentured servants); Stephen R. Arnott,
Autonomy, Standing, and Children’s Rights, 33 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 807, 814–15 (2007).
89
See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 19.
90
Cf. id.
91
CRC, supra note 4, art. 5.
92
Id. art. 7.
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his or her right.”93 Thus, there is a broader understanding of children’s rights
under both U.S. and international law that includes the notion that children
have a right to be parented by their formal legal parents and that such parents
should have freedom to act on their children’s behalf without governmental interference. This set of rights is quite distinct from children’s quasi-civil rights
because although they are intended to advance children’s interests, the interests
are completely subrogated to legal parents who hold such rights on behalf of
their children. Thus, it is the parents who struggle for such rights against the
state, and children are the beneficiaries.
Whether this category of children’s rights and interests legitimately reflects
children’s interests at all is often contested and the case law is often used to critique parental privacy rights as in opposition to children’s rights.94 Importantly,
children’s own voices may not be heard as parents are in a battle with the state.
However, children’s rights can be upheld even when they do not have autonomy or capacity to argue for themselves, and children’s own voices do not always need to be heard for their rights to be protected.95 In many instances it is
best for parents in loving families to make decisions for their children, and privacy rights support such decisions.96 Indeed, Emily Buss makes a compelling
case that parental privacy rights most effectively promote children’s best interests, arguing that too much state intrusion into a child’s upbringing, absent exceptional circumstances, will only complicate a child’s life.97 She argues that
state intervention comes at a cost and should therefore be “limited to those circumstances where the costs of failing to intervene are great enough to justify
the costs of intervention.” She makes this argument not only because parents
are best able to judge the best interests of children, but also because states must
rely on parental implementation of state-imposed directives pertaining to children’s best interests.98
It is not my argument that family privacy is the only means of effectuating
children’s rights; however, I do think it is an essential part of children’s interests. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues, “[children’s] growth to autonomy
depends on the care and guidance provided by bonded care givers in the intimacy of the family, and children rely for their very survival on these supportive
relationships.”99 Family privacy rights are not the enemy of children’s rights.
Quite the opposite, in most cases they are the best proxy for advancing chil-

93

Id. art. 14.
See, e.g., Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 138–44 (2009); Zug, supra note 12.
95
See, e.g., Minow, supra note 44, at 1882–85.
96
See, e.g., Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 647; Woodhouse, supra note 3, at
316.
97
Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 647–50.
98
Id. at 649.
99
Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 316.
94
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dren’s interests.100 Parents are still the primary providers of childcare and their
caregiving work is a central part of children’s interests.
The third category of children’s rights is the right to adequate care.101 This
right exists even if parents do not or cannot provide the necessary care. This
right extends beyond parental privacy and can be subdivided into two types:
rights to care that are effectuated by the state, and rights to care that are effectuated by private parties other than parents. The state, through its parens patriae power, is the legal guardian of children who do not have legal parents that
are adequately providing for their needs.102 The right to such state-provided
care is exercised in abuse and neglect proceedings, parental terminations, foster
placements, and so forth.103 In the CRC, these kinds of rights run throughout,
but are particularly highlighted in Article 19, which explicitly discusses the nation-states’ responsibility to prevent the abuse and neglect of children,104 and in
Article 20, which gives the child the right to government protection and alternative placement if taken from legal parents.105 In such cases, the government
acts as protector of the child and is usually in conflict with legal parents, when
acting to find suitable care in lieu of inadequate parental care.
Children’s right to care may also refer to duties filled by caregivers other
than formal parents. Quite a few commentators have promoted children’s right
100

Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 647–50.
See generally Ex parte L.E.O., 61 So. 3d 1042, 1047 (Ala. 2010); Michael Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 261–65 (1998);
Woodhouse, supra note 3 (suggesting a new rights discourse that emphasizes children’s
rights to have their basic needs met by adults as opposed to parental rights to raise children);
Marla Gottlieb Zwas, Note, Kinship Foster Care: A Relatively Permanent Solution, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 348 (1993) (discussing foster care children’s entitlement to a service plan including adequate care and services).
102
See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?,
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 322 (2010) (discussing the fact that “[i]t is well accepted that, pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, states are obligated to care for vulnerable children”);
Daniel L. Hatcher, Purpose vs. Power: Parens Patriae and Agency Self-Interest, 42 N.M. L.
REV. 159, 171–72 (2012) (highlighting the fact that “State agencies step in to protect [the]
rights and interests [of children] when the parents can no longer appropriately care for their
children”).
103
See, e.g., In re Morgan, Nos. 9-04-02, 9-04-03, 2004 WL 1717934 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
2, 2004) (terminating a mother’s parental rights to her twin sons, and granting permanent
custody to the child agency); In re Pittman, No. 20894, 2002 WL 987852 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 8, 2002) (terminating mother’s parental rights and granting custody to state agency);
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 2 (Jan. 2013), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf (outlining the common statutory grounds for determining parental unfitness and citing neglect as
first on the list); Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent’s Use of Drugs as Factor in Award of
Custody of Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 20 A.L.R. 5TH
534, 537–39 (1994) (finding that a mother and father addicted to heroin were unfit to maintain their parental rights).
104
CRC, supra note 4, art. 19.
105
Id. art. 20.
101
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to care as delivered by third parties other than the state or parents, often called
de facto or functional parents.106 Such functional caregivers may provide necessary daily care in support, or in lieu, of formal legal parents when they are
not able to fulfill their obligations.107 Such caregivers create significant relationships with children who may acquire a right to state protection of those relationships. Accordingly, “functional parents” may be tagged with a duty of
continued support as a consequence of care they provided in the past.108 The
CRC can be understood to support the rights of functional parents, although it
does not discuss them as explicitly as it does other kinds of rights. In Article 5,
the Convention refers to respect for rights and responsibilities of parents or “the
members of the extended family or community as provided by local custom” to
provide direction and guidance to children in their exercise of rights.109 In addition, some argue that “functional parents” should be included under the term
“parents.”110 In this category of rights the child and third-party caregivers seek
protection of their relationship from the state, potentially, but not necessarily,
over the objection of a legal parent.111 In other cases, a legal parent may consent to such relationships but the state may not offer a framework to support
them.112
106

See, e.g., Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 85–96 (2004); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 74 (2007); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat,
supra note 13, at 439–41; Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 455 (2008).
107
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (2002) (defining “de facto parent”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 20–21 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs,
Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 314–32 (2007); Kavanagh, supra note 106,
at 85 (“[T]he rule of the ‘exclusive’ family . . . is a central problem in family law in the
United States . . . [It] is harmful to children, families, and the public interest [because it is]
an intentionally, but unnecessarily, limited vision of parenthood that distorts the narrative of
too many people’s lives.”); Murray, supra note 106, at 394; see, e.g., H. v. H., 676 N.Y.S.2d
677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); In re Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028, 1029–30 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278, 1281–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 2000); Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843, 845 (S.D. 1996).
108
See DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 123–67; Laufer-Ukeles & BlecherPrigat, supra note 13, at 464, 467.
109
CRC, supra note 4, art. 5.
110
See Appleton, supra note 107, at 59; Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Legal Relationship
Between Cohabitants and Their Partners’ Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127,
150–51 (2012) (arguing that functional parents should be treated like “parents” for purposes
of the necessity to give particular weight to parental prerogatives discussed in Troxel); Buss,
“Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 650–52.
111
See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 421–23.
112
Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and
Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 335 (discussing how functional parenting arrangements, such as same-sex partnerships, are extremely vulnerable to negative custody determinations when the legal parent dies); see Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CALIF. L. REV.
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Each category of rights described above has different primary parties and
processes through which children can effectuate their rights. Thus, both the nature of and the parties involved in these rights vary considerably, so different
procedural methods for achieving different rights are appropriate. In the case of
children’s “quasi-civil rights,” lawyers are best to advocate on behalf of children.113 Lawyers are also best when children are treated as adults or have adultlike proceedings against them—such as the termination of parental rights for
teen parents114—and certainly when minors are involved in the criminal system.115 On the other hand, when evaluating the best care situation for dependent
children, whether during divorce, parental termination cases, or foster and
adoption placements, it may be reasonable to rely upon guardians ad litem who
work for the courts and can examine the child’s care situation in depth.116 Attorneys representing children are often faced with dilemmas of whether to advocate based on children’s wishes or their beliefs regarding the child’s best interests, particularly for children between the ages of six and fourteen.117 Thus,
an attorney may be helpful, but should be used in addition to a guardian ad litem, not instead of one, given the other pressures facing attorneys and their
more limited training in social and child protection.118 When dealing with the
care of older children who have a right to express their own interests and wishes, some methods for including children’s voices, like mediation119 or providing a guardian ad litem and an attorney, would be appropriate.120 Although all
1177, 1200 (2010) (examining equitable doctrines for functional parents and noting that not
all states apply these equitable doctrines).
113
See Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1675
(1996); Barbara Glesner Fines, Challenges of Representing Adolescent Parents in Child Welfare Proceedings, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 314–17 (2011).
114
Fines, supra note 113, at 314.
115
See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967) (giving children right to council in juvenile delinquency and criminal proceedings); Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a
Child?: Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency
Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836 (2006).
116
See Symposium, Session 3: Children’s Rights in the Context of Welfare, Dependency,
and the Juvenile Court, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 267, 269–70 (2004) (discussing
benefits of a CASA child advocate or guardian ad litem in representing children’s voices in
dependency proceedings).
117
Id. at 275.
118
Id.; cf. Barbara Glesner Fines & Cathy Madsen, Caring Too Little, Caring Too Much:
Competence and the Family Law Attorney, 75 UMKC L. REV. 965, 965–66 (2007) (arguing
that all family law attorneys should be experienced in dealing with their clients’ psychological demands).
119
Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings,
22 TOURO L. REV. 745, 777–80 (2006); Melissa J. Schoffer, Note, Bringing Children to the
Mediation Table: Defining a Child’s Best Interest in Divorce Mediation, 43 FAM. CT. REV.
323, 323–24 (2005).
120
Cf. Barbara Glesner Fines, Pressures Toward Mediocrity in Representation of Children,
37 CAP. U. L. REV. 411, 445–47 (2008) (evaluating attorney and guardian ad litem perceptions of their respective roles in the system).
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these methods are used to get at the child’s best interests and thereby pursue
children’s rights, an initial identification of the kind of children’s rights to
which we are referring may streamline the inquiry and reduce the need for a variety of methods.
In sum, “children’s rights” can be pursued in many different ways, have
many different aspects and parties, and delineate conceptually diverse and not
infrequently opposing goals. Although all these rights are valid and appropriate
depending on the context, the mere use of the term “children’s rights” to define
or prove anything can be confusing and amorphous due to these potentially
conflicting meanings. Indeed, if we spend more time breaking down and considering the nature of the various rights at stake, we can do better in helping
children effectuate those rights.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH BEST INTERESTS: INDIVIDUALISM, CONFLICT, AND
THE CLASH OF RIGHTS
A. Best Interests and the Problem of Optimization
While “children’s rights” can be divided and separated to delineate coherent goals and conflicting parties, the term “best interests” is often used to cover
advocacy for all such rights and various potentially conflicting interests.121
Rights can guarantee a certain baseline of civil and care-based protections secured by caregivers and the state. Regardless of the approach, whether through
a capabilities approach to basic rights,122 an egalitarian approach,123 or a
Rawlsian equilibrium view of rights,124 agreeing on the basic rights of children
is by far a more manageable and modest challenge than deciding upon what is
optimal for children. Children’s interests can be broad and include debatable
goals regarding what is conducive to a child’s well-being and are easier to articulate because there is no burden of optimization.
In the context of custody decisions, best interests analyses are based on a
variety of factors. Such factors often include, among others, the suitability and
quality of the care being offered, the levels of conflict surrounding custody disputes, the children’s wishes, and past caretaking arrangements.125 As part of
121

See McLaughlin, supra note 94, at 131.
See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5–6 (2000) (explaining the focus of the “capabilities approach”);
Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151 (2005).
123
See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
124
See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
125
See Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule”, 41 U.
BALT. L. REV. 83, 150 (2011) (discussing how, when making custody determinations, courts
consider evidence regarding conflict between the parties each parties contribution to creating
such conflict); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents
as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 1129 (1985) (discussing how several
122
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this broad inquiry, religious126 and financial factors are often taken into account,127 as are marital and extended family situations,128 family violence,129
and cultural and racial considerations.130 The inquiry is broad, flexible, and
context specific. Children’s own stated preferences are usually considered, although the weight given to such preferences varies by state and by the age of
the child.131 The inquiry often entails competing and conflicting considerations
between two fit parents. Still, the best interests standard is the dominant tool for
determining custody in the United States,132 and the normative goal in international conventions.133
courts have looked to who fulfilled the primary caretaker role in making custody arrangements); D.W. O’Neill, Annotation, Child’s Wishes as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R.
3D 1396 (1965) (discussing how the child’s wishes are also a factor in custody determinations).
126
See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Alaska 1979) (holding that religious factors are part of the best interests inquiry, and that holding otherwise would render a court
blind to important elements bearing on the child’s best interest); see also Gary M. Miller,
Note, Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and
the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (1995) (considering
how courts consider religion as a proper factor in the best interest test).
127
See Carolyn J. Frantz, Note, Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in PostDivorce Child Custody Disputes, 99 MICH. L. REV. 216, 217 (2000) (highlighting how many
courts consider financial factors in custody hearings).
128
See, e.g., David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Significant Connection Jurisdiction of
Court to Modify Foreign Child Custody Decree Under §§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(1), 67 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1999) (listing
cases considering the extended family of the child in making custody jurisdiction determinations).
129
See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1070 (1991); Woodhouse, supra note
81, at 826; see also Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal
Implications of Family Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 157 (2000) (highlighting that “[c]hild custody and visitation
decisions must be made with full knowledge of the previous family violence and potential
for continued danger, whether or not the children have been physically harmed”).
130
See Kathryn Beer, Note, An Unnecessary Gray Area: Why Courts Should Never Consider Race in Child Custody Determinations, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 271, 273 (2011) (finding
that state courts across the country have decided custody cases based on race, and arguing
that state court’s should be precluded from considering race in child custody bases).
131
See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey
and Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 640–41 (2003) (children’s wishes usually
relevant but not dispositive); see also Tasker v. Tasker, 395 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (concluding trial court properly denied interview because court had discretion to
make determination); O’Neill, supra note 125, at 1402–09.
132
See Wallin v. Wallin, 187 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn. 1971) (reviewing the best-interest-ofthe-child concept as key to determining custody disputes); Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242,
248 (R.I. 2004) (highlighting that “[i]t long has been established that in awarding custody,
placement, and visitation rights, the ‘foremost consideration’ is the best interests of the
child”); D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Award of Custody of Child Where Contest is Between
Child’s Mother and Grandparent, 29 A.L.R. 3D 366, 379, 384 (1970) (defining a child’s
welfare as the primary consideration for courts, and how “courts have also implemented a
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Much has been said in criticism of the ambiguity and discretionary nature
of the best interests standard and the way it can negatively impact cases that
depend on it.134 Here, I add to that criticism by making the case that in most instances the use of the best interests standard is not helpful because it involves
too many conflicting interests. Because the best interests standard mirrors and
incorporates all the different children’s rights discussed above, such factors can
easily conflict. Thus, the inquiry is often not only broad and ambiguous but internally inconsistent.
In the face of conflicts and ambiguity, it is not surprising that state perspectives and interests prevail. Children’s rights to care from parents and to care
from the state are conflated into a singular judgment by the state about the “best
care.” Ultimately, if children have a right to parental care, this means that parents need to be given discretion to care for children in a diversity of ways.
However, when the state is involved in judging care, its interests in children
and the majoritarian values often expressed by the state can be in direct conflict
with parental privacy.135 Using the term “best” to resolve this conflict is a futile
strategy because it will depend on the opinions of judges and what is best is
nearly impossible to prove. Moreover, as the examples below will demonstrate,
leaving the state to determine what is best for children in an isolated manner
will often result in an analysis that separates a child’s interests from a caregiver’s interests in the difficult custody battles that the state must resolve.
When courts attempt to locate children’s best interests it is no surprise that
such an attempt is expensive and includes a variety of opinions from judges,
guardians, parents, the children themselves, third-party caregivers, mediators,
psychologists, and social welfare professionals.136 And even with all of this exwide range of other procedural rules in order to effect the result which will best serve the
child’s interests”).
133
See CRC, supra note 4 passim (“Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of
the child will be their basic concern.”); Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of
Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here and
Abroad, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 756–57 (2003) (discussing how the
“Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, . . . and Measures to Protect Children
states that recognition of a foreign custody order may be refused ‘if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the requested State, taking into account the best interests of the child’ ”).
134
See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 (1984); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best
Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 267 (1987); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4
(1987); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1525 (1994); Mnookin,
supra note 27, at 227.
135
See infra Part II.B.
136
See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 772 (1988) (discussing the need for
experts); Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making—How Judges
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pensive input, it is perhaps impossibly difficult to “optimize” between suitable
(non-harmful) caregivers or to accurately determine what is “best” for children.137 Such expertise does not actually create the verifiability and certainty
that it promises.138 As others have argued, such indeterminacy simply throws
the decision back to judges, creating contested and expensive litigation or bargaining in the context of uncertainty that usually favors the more powerful party.139 Best interests is a goal, not a standard that can provide clear answers.140
Therefore, what is important is to assign clear responsibility so that the parties
can work it out themselves in a reasonable manner.141 For a standard upon
which so much of the advancement of children relies, all we really get is very
little guidance, high costs, and uncertainty.
In the next section, I will give some examples of how internal contradictions in the meaning of best interests render the standard ineffective. I will
demonstrate how using the best interests standard creates reliance on majoritarian values, provides simplistic answers despite underlying complexity, overemphasizes the tension between caregiver and children’s interest, and uses state
interests to inform what is best for children.
B. Examples of Indeterminacy and Separation Between Care and Caregiver
To demonstrate how the best interests standard and its individualistic focus
on children’s rights does not do enough to support children and provide the
care they need, I will give some practical examples that have divided scholars
on the merits of best interests. In these examples, there is seeming conflict between caregivers and children, or state and parental rights, and in the face of
such conflicts the best interests standard struggles to determine what is best for
children. These are examples of the hard cases, the cases that fall between the
Use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 10 (1998) (discussing how the courts in assessing the best interest of the
child usually require an expert witness which increases the hardship for the parties); Veazey
v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) (recognizing that although a guardian ad litem
increases the costs, a mediator or disinterested expert is often useful in custody cases).
137
See Ariel Ayanna, From Children’s Interests to Parental Responsibility: Degendering
Parenthood Through Custodial Obligation, 19 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2–3 (2012) (arguing
against trying to optimize under a best interests standard due to the difficulties involved).
138
Scott & Emery, supra note 7, at 73–74.
139
See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 954–57 (1979) (discussing the effects of bargaining in the context of uncertainty and, in particularly, effects on the weaker more riskaverse party); Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child Custody, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 54, 71–72 (2002).
140
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 957; Katherine C. Sheehan, Note, PostDivorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 135, 138 (1986)
(calling the best interest test “intrusive, unworkable, and indeterminate”).
141
See Mnookin & Maccoby, supra note 139, at 72 (“Instead, the more basic criticism is
that the best interests standard provides an uncertain backdrop for out-of-court negotiations.”).
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need for parental termination where caregiver relationships with children have
completely broken down and instances where parental privacy is regularly accepted. It is in these kinds of cases that the need to protect children’s interests
and rights is most pressing and sensitive to manipulation. These examples of
the clash of rights generally and caregiver and children’s rights in particular
demonstrate the futility of the individualized best interests standard. Best interests is at best inconclusive and is at worst biased in a manner that reinforces
majoritarian cultural norms, allows state interests to override established caregiving relationships, and imposes an idealized notion of care on the caregiving
relationship upon which the child is already dependent.
1. Deportation of U.S. Citizen Children with Alien Parents
What should be done with the U.S. citizen children of illegal aliens who
are being deported back to their countries of citizenship? Not infrequently, the
state determines the fate of children who have already been removed from their
parental homes because of insufficient living conditions and problematic circumstances usually intertwined with their parents’ illegal status.142 The recent
trend is to determine the children’s fate—whether to remain with parents and
be deported with them or to remain in the United States under state care—
based on a best interests analysis as opposed to a parental rights analysis in
which children would only be removed from parental care upon a showing of
unfitness.143 In her two articles on the subject,144 Marcia Zug advocates for the
use of the best interests standard in situations where children have been removed from parental custody prior to deportation.145 Others have argued
against the use of the best interests standard and in favor of maintaining nonU.S. citizens’ parental rights.146 Those in favor of a best interests determination
argue that because children have the right to stay in the United States and their

142

Zug, supra note 12, at 1174–75. See generally Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 63 (2012) (analyzing the growing practice of
separating deported immigrants from their children).
143
See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he termination of
the father’s parental rights was based on the possibility that the father could someday be deported and, with her mother’s parental rights also severed, [the child] might be returned to
[state] custody or sent to Mexico.”); In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that termination of father’s parental rights by the juvenile court was premature
where there was less than clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent despite
the fact that the lower court found that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the father’s rights); In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234, 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (the juvenile court
wrongfully terminated the parents’ rights based on a finding of “environmental neglect, consisting of inadequate sleeping accommodations for the children in [the parents’] home”).
144
Yablon-Zug, supra note 151; Zug, supra note 12;.
145
Zug, supra note 12, at 1142.
146
Stacy Byrd, Note, Learning From the Past: Why Termination of a Non-Citizen Parent’s
Rights Should Not Be Based on the Child’s Best Interest, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 327
(2013).
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parents do not, children and parental interests may not align; therefore, to protect children, the best interests standard is preferred over parental rights.147
In such cases, the state and parents will often disagree as to what is best for
the child. How can the state determine that it is in a child’s interests to stay in
the United States and be raised by foster or adoptive parents rather than remain
with their biological parents and be raised by them? Being raised by one’s own
parents is a child’s right; so is receiving state-provided care when parental care
is insufficient. Therefore, if fit parents are available, how can the state justify
the termination of parental rights based on the child’s rights and best interests?
On the other hand, if these children have already been removed from parental care due to suboptimal living conditions, one could argue that these cases
no longer involve caregiver rights. However, these removals are not infrequently based on illegal status and poor living conditions, so this seems an unjust
conclusion—punishing illegal residents with detachment from children.148
Moreover, the time these children have been away from their parents may not
have diminished the caregiving relationship previously established, depending
on the circumstances. On the contrary, these children’s lives are in great tumult
as they are living with foster families and their parents are in danger of being
deported. Studies demonstrate that relationships between parents and children
are not easily broken during short-term separations even when there has been
abuse and neglect—and in such cases there has not been sufficient evidence to
sever parental rights or prove abuse and neglect definitively.149
Thus, the use of best interests instead of a parental rights doctrine mitigates
the importance of these parental caregiving relationships. Indeed, allowing the
best interests standard to determine custody instead of the usual abuse and neglect standard allows a state’s interest in its citizen children to override chil-

147

See James G. Dwyer, Parent’s Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine
of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1373–79 (1994) (discussing the conflict between
parental rights and children’s rights in the context of religious schooling); David J. Herring,
Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes:
Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV.
139, 141–43 (1992); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV.
637, 638–40 (2006) (“[T]he debate between advocates of parents’ rights and children’s
rights is charged and polarized.”); Zug, supra note 12, at 1164–66.
148
Zug, supra note 12, at 1174–75; cf. Naomi Cahn, Placing Children in Context: Parents,
Foster Care, and Poverty, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN: THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145, 145, 150 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington eds., 2009) (The author clarifies that, in reality, children are most often removed from
their homes because of unstable parental income, and the author points to the strong correlation between poverty and child abuse and neglect. For example, children who live in families
that make less than $15,000 per year are forty-five times more likely to be abused or neglected).
149
See Marsha Garrison, Parents’ Rights vs. Children’s Interests: The Case of the Foster
Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 381 (1996); Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing
Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 129–34 (2013).
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dren’s interest to be raised by parents.150 Zug does not specifically include the
right to be raised by one’s parents as part of a child’s rights or best interests;151
however, Zug and the state decisions upon which she relies, support the validity
of parental privacy rights to some extent.152 To justify abrogating parental
rights without a finding of abuse or neglect, one must rely on the state’s interests for removal. Zug argues that some state interests weigh in favor of keeping
children in the United States, namely “the state’s interest in teaching children
fundamental values of a democratic society” and “the state’s interest in keeping
American children connected to America.”153 Therefore, the best interests analysis is used to make room for state interests and to limit children’s interests in
being raised by parents. In conjunction with the state’s own interests, the state
will also consider majoritarian values regarding what is best for children—
living in a wealthier economy and perhaps what is perceived to be a more stable household than that of deported aliens. Thus, the state minimizes children’s
rights to be raised by their own parents in favor of state interests and majoritarian values, and justifies this exchange in the name of best interests.
In this way, citizen children’s rights to be cared for by parents are limited
in favor of state interests in a manner that discriminates between children of illegal aliens and children of citizens.154 Just as one may argue that children of
150

Zug admits that a best interest standard does not automatically require termination from
parents and in fact argues that in most cases it will not. In addition, she points to the fact that
best interests analyses also involve parental considerations because, “[o]ne cannot consider
the rights of children without also considering the rights of the people on whom they are dependent, most often their parents.” Zug, supra note 12, at 1170. However, she continues to
refer to the scenario where children remain with parents as one under the umbrella of “parental rights” which stands in opposition to children’s rights under a best interests standard. Id.
at 1171 (“The strongest argument favoring parental rights is that parental rights do not just
benefit parents, but they also benefit children. . . . As discussed above, the well-established
criticisms of a parental rights standard cast significant doubt on these assumptions in general.”).
151
Id. at 1171.
152
Id. at 1178 (“However, it is not obvious that children’s interests outweigh the equally
substantial interests of fit parents in the care and custody of their children.”); Id. at 1182
(“However, parental rights and children’s rights can and must coexist. As the long fight between children’s rights and parental rights advocates has shown, both standards have their
place but neither one is right for all circumstances.”).
153
Id. at 1147–51.
154
Others who make a stronger child’s rights argument and are against any parents rights
considerations in custody decisions, such as James G. Dwyer, argue that custody should always be made in the best interests of children without consideration of parental rights. Indeed, for children born to at risk parents he has advocated that a children’s rights approach
requires the removal of children from parents to adoptive or foster homes without the state
having to prove abuse and neglect. See generally Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra
note 12. In this manner, Dwyer’s position could justify ignoring parental claims of noncitizens in the same way it does its citizens. But, of course, this strong state interference position in determining children’s best interests is nonetheless troubling for those who believe
that parents generally have a right to raise their children as long as they have not been proven unfit to do so or the belief that children have a right to be raised by these parents. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected
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aliens are better off with a U.S. family, so could it be argued that the children
of poor and unstable U.S. citizen families are better off with wealthier and
more secure U.S. families.155 Children’s rights to be raised by their own parents
should be applied consistently as between children of citizen and non-citizen
parents. And, if imposing state interests and value judgments on children of citizens is rejected it should be rejected for children of aliens as well.
As I will argue in the next parts, instead of trying in this artificial manner
to make sense of the interests of children and caregivers individualistically, the
state should focus on supporting the caregiving relationships that support its
citizens. If a citizen has an alien parent, despite the parent’s illegality, the reason to let the parent stay in the United States is the furtherance of children’s interests. It is clearly controversial to provide such a benefit to an illegal alien
merely because they have given birth to a U.S. citizen; but, that is a consequence of the naturalization process in the United States156 Once a child is a citizen and if the state is truly interested in protecting the child’s rights, the state
should not punish the children by deporting their parents. If, however, parents
of U.S. citizens are to be deported, then the test should remain one of parental
fitness, just as it is for U.S. citizens. State interests cannot justify abrogating
caregiver rights in the name of children’s rights.
2. Cultural Rights of Native American Children
The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) was intended to empower Native
Americans to determine the identity and placement of children with Native
American parents.157 Seeking to protect Native American civil rights and to
maintain the cultural identity of Native American children, Congress enacted
Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and to
raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights,’ . . . and ‘[r]ights far
more precious . . . than property rights.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding parental right to raise children without undue governmental interference is fundamental liberty interest); see also Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children,
and Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond the Supreme Court’s Approach, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 459, 490–98 (1982) (reviewing constitutional protections afforded to parents, children,
and family privacy, and arguing “intrusion is only justified under extremely exigent circumstances”).
155
Zug, supra note 12, at 1177. Zug describes domestic violence and potential death due to
cultural realties in Guatemala—but if a child is so threatened, then refugee status for both
child and mother may be appropriate. Moreover, the description of the entire country of Guatemala as dangerous to children seems problematic and perhaps exaggerated. Id.
156
See Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 494–95 (1995) (arguing
against deportation of parents of children citizens in the name of children’s rights).
157
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1915 (2012) (creating barriers to removal of Native American Children from their parents and tribes, including the right
of tribal intervention in removal proceedings and preference for placement with Native
American families); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (“Congress . . . has assumed the responsibility for
the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources . . . .”).
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the ICWA to assure that children are raised within their Native American heritage. Thus, the ICWA recognizes the civil rights of Native Americans and the
quasi-civil rights of Native American children to their own cultural and racial
identities.158 This issue invokes the tension between children’s civil rights to
identity and children’s right to receive care from the state.
Many have noted, however, that the implementation of the ICWA has not
met its promise to preserve cultural identity because it too often devolves into a
“best interests” analysis that state courts have used to keep Native American
children with non-tribal foster parents instead of transferring them to tribal authorities.159 Critics argue that the goal of the ICWA to protect children’s civil
rights has been essentially swallowed up by judicially created exceptions, such
as the “existing Indian family” exception and “good cause” justifications not to
transfer Indian child welfare cases to the tribe for resolution.160 According to
these exceptions, if a Native American child is not removed from an existing
Native American family or there is other good cause, the case remains in state
courts for determination of what is best for children. State application of “best
interests” prefers psychological ties to biological ties, and nuclear families to
single-parent and extended families.161 Thus, a state’s enforcement of best interests in custody undermines the civil rights that the ICWA was supposed to
grant these tribes.162 Because dependency rights conflict with quasi-civil rights
in these cases, and both types of rights are part of a broader best interests analysis, the state’s understanding of the best upbringing for Native American children gets wrapped up in the best interests label and usually defeats those quasicivil rights. Placing these two kinds of rights against each other in the best in-

158

25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1915.
See, e.g., BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, CHILDREN, TRIBES, AND STATES: ADOPTION AND
CUSTODY CONFLICTS OVER AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 7–8 (2010); Appell, supra note 58,
at 162–65; Cheyañna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L.
REV. 733, 753 (2006); B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State
Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395, 422–29 (1997); Kevin Noble Maillard, Parental Ratification:
Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in Cross-Racial Adoption, 28 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 107, 124–39 (2003) (exploring how courts, using majoritarian, essentialist notions of
“Indian-ness”, determine whether a parent is sufficiently Indian to make the child an “Indian
child” for purposes of the ICWA); Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American
Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 329, 366–67 (2009); Alissa M. Wilson, Note, The Best Interests of Children
in the Cultural Context of the Indian Child Welfare Act in In re S.S. and R.S., 28 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 839, 886 (1997); Kacy Wothe, Note, The Ambiguity of Culture as a Best Interests
Factor: Finding Guidance in the Indian Child Welfare Act’s Qualified Expert Witness, 35
HAMLINE. L. REV. 729, 758–75 (2012).
160
Appell, supra note 58, at 162.
161
Id. at 165.
162
Id.
159
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terests framework creates confusion and, in these cases, abrogates the civil
rights of children.
Despite the complex choices involved in determining whether children
should grow up within their tribe or in third-party foster homes, the use of best
interests creates the façade that courts are making rational, clear-minded judgments about a child’s best interests.163 Thus, because courts have nothing but
their own subjective judgments on which to base decisions when thinking about
best interests, “decisionmakers often underestimate the value of the poor parents of color, the child’s ties to them and his or her cultural heritage.”164
In the ICWA cases, as in the case of aliens who are being deported, the
state takes up the mantle of children’s rights, arguing that children have rights
to normative majoritarian visions of the “best” or “ideal” care. However, children’s rights are more complicated because identity and cultural issues are also
at stake—not only for the parents or the tribe but for the children as well. Indeed, it is problematic to identify children’s rights with majoritarian thinking
about suitability when other factors also play into children’s rights, including
parental privacy rights, quasi-civil rights, and cultural benefits in dependency
rights, which may be in the interests of children as well. The dichotomy between parental rights to culture and children’s rights to care ignores what is the
multi-factored and self-contradictory nature of the best interests standard itself.
In deportation cases, parental privacy is overshadowed when determining
best interests, and in ICWA cases, the children’s quasi civil-rights to their cultural identities, as well as the benefits of being cared for in their biological culture, are undervalued. Yet again, best interests is used to hide a more complex
determination by looking at children’s interests in isolation from their more
complex needs. Although this example may seem tangential to the clash of
caregivers’ rights and children’s rights examined in this article, as the tribe may
not yet have had a chance to form such a relationship with the child, this example clearly demonstrates the indeterminacy of best interests in the face of conflict between children’s civil rights and dependency rights. This is a primary
example of difficult custody decisions regarding children, in which the best interests standard is supposed to be applied.165 Moreover, when children have
multiple potential claims to relationships—here to foster parents and relationships with biological kin—all of these relationships would have to be taken into
account under a relational perspective to properly give credence to caregiver
rights.166

163

Id.
Id. at 166.
165
See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 121–23 (S.D. 1996) (considering whether the
benefits of retaining cultural identity can be considered as part of custody dispute).
166
See infra text accompanying notes 278–80 for a discussion of how biological and cultural kin ties may also be a basis for forming an important and necessary caregiver relationship.
164
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3. Rights of Children to Relationships with Birth Parents
The third example I bring relates to the rights of children to have relationships with biological parents even when parental privacy has been compromised by abuse and neglect. Children’s rights advocates have pushed for early
termination of biological parental rights culminating in the adoption of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”).167 Before or after the termination
of parental rights, the question remains whether children should retain any legal
or emotional relationship with biological parents who they had relationships
with before being placed in the foster system.168 This issue emphasizes the tension between children’s right to relationships with biological parents as a matter of identity and past care, and their right to be provided adequate care by the
state.
Of course, if having contact with biological parents will continue to impose
significant harm on children, such contact cannot be tolerated. However, there
are instances, particularly for older children who feel attached to biological kin,
where some contact, perhaps under supervision, may be more beneficial than
harmful. Scholars have argued that even if children cannot live with their parents and the state must step in to protect their rights by placing them in foster
care, this is not the end of the inquiry into how to advocate on behalf of children.169 From a child’s perspective, it is argued, the continuing bond with a biological parent, as long as it is not harmful, can be important for providing continuity, identity, and security.170 Despite the “bad” parenting that led to foster
placement, children’s attachment to such caregiving parents is often strong.171
Reviewing psychological studies, Marsha Garrison posits that a non-custodial
parental figure that has provided significant amounts of care can also have a
significant impact on a child’s life.172 Such insights have had some influence on
the law. For instance, there is a preference for kin foster care over stranger foster care in many states, even if kin only know the child and do not have direct
biological ties with him or her.173 These changes reflect complex notions of
167

ASFA amends Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act, which governs states’
federally funded child-protective efforts. Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A
Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1
(2001). For representative discussions of ASFA, see generally Stephanie Jill Gendell, In
Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act Implementation, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 25 (2001).
168
See Annette R. Appell, Controlling for Kin: Ghosts in the Postmodern Family, 25 WIS.
J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 73, 120 (2010).
169
Garrison, supra note 149, at 377–90; Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 498–99 (“For children, connection to others is a precondition to autonomy and individuality.”).
170
Garrison, supra note 149, at 382–83; Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 498.
171
Garrison, supra note 149, at 380–81.
172
Id. at 383.
173
Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 502–03; see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Making Poor
Mothers Fungible: The Privatization of Foster Care, in CHILD CARE & INEQUALITY:
RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH 83, 85 (Francesca M. Cancian et al. eds.,
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children’s needs and interests beyond the majoritarian visions of biological nuclear families.174 Children’s identity and attachment to parents and former
caregivers, even in problematic contexts, may make kin care and some contact
with parents beneficial. Thus, protecting children’s interests may require more
than just foster care and adoption; children’s best interests may also require a
continued connection with biological parents through open adoption arrangements even after parental rights are terminated. Although majoritarian norms
regarding what is best for children point to nuclear families that mirror intact
biological families, such situations may not be appropriate for children of broken homes.
Once again, best interests seems to collapse into a majoritarian view of the
benefits of the nuclear family without sufficient consideration given to the
complexity of family life, particularly with regard to children who are being
removed from parental care. I cannot comment on what is “best” for children in
the abstract or even with regard to any particular case, and this is not my goal;
rather, my aim is to underscore that the determination of what is best is far
more complicated than legislation and courts usually acknowledge. An interdependency perspective on children’s rights could support an ongoing relationship with biological birth parents in a manner different from that of formal legal adoptive parents, depending on the potential for harm caused by the
biological parents.175
Indeed, as we saw in the deportation cases with regard to state interests in
promoting democracy and connections with its citizen children, Garrison explores interests beyond those of children, such as those of the state, which
might be persuading decision makers to emphasize adoption over kin foster
care, and closed adoption over open adoption, as the “best” situations for children despite research that indicates otherwise.176 She argues that the lower cost
of adoption compared to subsidized foster care and the novelty and uncertainty
of foster guardianship and open adoption make change slow. In addition, she
recognizes that adoptive parents prefer closed adoptions and seek children to
adopt that do not have ties to kin of biological parents.177 Thus, she says it is
largely state and adoptive parental interests that influence policy and perhaps
“creep” into best interests analyses that are supposed to focus only on children.

2002) (“Kinfolk and extended family have been recruited to serve as paid foster mothers,
and by 1998 at least half of the states’ placements of children was with relatives.”); Sandra J.
Altshuler, Child Well-Being in Kinship Foster Care: Similar to, or Different from, NonRelated Foster Care?, 20 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 369, 369 (1998) (“The most striking increases have been in the number of children placed in kinship foster care.”).
174
Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 503.
175
See infra Part IV.A; see also Appell, supra note 168, at 74; Godsoe, supra note 158, at
160.
176
Garrison, supra note 149, at 386–387 (discussing cost and attractiveness to adopting parents as reasons state may prefer adoption over foster care).
177
Id.
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4. Removing Babies at Birth from At-Risk Caregivers
Although the right to reproduce and become a parent is only very rarely
limited,178 James G. Dwyer and others179 have suggested that a best interests
analysis can justify removing babies from high-risk parents at the time of
birth.180 Dwyer argues that at birth children have the right to be placed with
parents who will act in their best interests and that parents who have a history
of abuse and neglect, are below eighteen years of age, imprisoned, have been
convicted of a violent or sexual offense, have a mental illness or incapacity, or
who already have multiple children on welfare, may not reach that standard.
Therefore, their parenthood should be subject to judicial determination based
on the welfare of the child and not determined by birth.181 In addition, Dwyer
has argued that keeping babies with mothers who are jailed, as a number of
states in the United States have allowed and others are considering,182 has been
part of the prison system for more than a century, and that is even more common abroad,183 violates children’s constitutional rights and their best interests.184 These programs allow mothers to parent a child in prison for a prede178
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” (emphasis omitted)); see, e.g., State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001)
(allowing limit on reproductive freedom as terms of probation for deadbeat dad).
179
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF. L.
REV. 1321, 1360 (2012).
180
DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 254–56.
181
Id. at 255–62.
182
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Nebraska, New York, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia
and Wyoming allow such programs. James G. Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, 2014 UTAH L.
REV. 465, 470–71; Connecticut is currently considering such a program. See DIAMOND
RESEARCH CONSULTING, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS: LITERATURE REVIEW AND
FACT SHEET FOR CT (2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/JUDdata/Tmy
/2013HB-06642-R000401-Sarah%20Diamond%20-%20Director,%20Diamond%20Research
%20Consulting-TMY.pdf.
183
Mother-child prison programs are much more common in Europe and Asia than in the
United States Indeed very few countries are similar to the United States in routinely separating young children from mothers not detained in high security prisons. In prison programs
worldwide it is not uncommon for children to attend daycare centers during the day. See,
e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN & ALISON SHAMES, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING AND
PRISON PRACTICES IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 16 (2013), available at http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources
/Handout/2014/2014-01-10_VERA-EuropeanCJPractices_2013-10.pdf; Michal Gilad & Tal
Gat, U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution for Children of Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 394–96 (2013).
184
The discussion of children’s constitutional “liberty” rights is beyond the scope of this
article. Dwyer also argues that jailhouses nurseries are against a child’s best interests. See
Dwyer, supra note 182, at 536–37.
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termined amount of time, which may be subject to extension, under specified
circumstances and almost always have maximum age limitations for the children.185 Dwyer argues that living in a jailhouse setting cannot be best for children regardless of age or emotional state in any circumstance.186
There is no doubt that Dwyer’s arguments are compelling. Both incarcerating children and leaving them with at-risk parents appear to be deeply problematic practices. Dwyer’s article on jailhouse nurseries is incredibly thorough and
well-documented.187 Nonetheless, although I do not argue that all such jailhouse nursery programs should be continued under any circumstances, the
blanket rejection of jailhouse nurseries seems not to account for the nuances of
children’s interests and the ways in which such programs may be good for particular children. Studies document benefits for children and mothers.188
Dwyer’s blanket assertions that all such programs should be prohibited and that
the parental rights of all at-risk parents should be questioned can threaten children’s relationships with caregivers.
The readiness with which scholars are willing to sever the relationship between children and parents at birth may imply that the parental caregiving relationship begins at birth. However, gestation creates a significant connection between fetus and mother before birth.189 The physical, emotional, and functional
care relationship based on interdependency, biological exchange, and physical
nurturance is a real and lasting care relationship.190 Studies demonstrate that
185

All but one jailhouse nursery program limit participation to mothers whose expected release date is before the child will reach the maximum age of 18 months, and who have no
history of violent crime or criminal child maltreatment; New York does not appear to have
such limitations. See id. at 472.
186
Id. at 535.
187
I focus on Dwyer’s arguments in Jailing Black Babies, supra note 182, as representative
of the kind of best interests arguments Dwyer makes, but will make references to his arguments in his book, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 12, as well.
188
For examples of studies that document the benefits of prison nurseries, see JULIE KOWITZ
MARGOLIES & TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT,
WHEN “FREE” MEANS LOSING YOUR MOTHER: THE COLLISION OF CHILD WELFARE AND THE
INCARCERATION OF WOMEN IN NEW YORK STATE 9 (2006) (children who are not able to
maintain contact with incarcerated mothers are at greater risk of abusing drugs and/or alcohol later on in life. They are also at a greater risk for committing crimes and for underachieving in school); Lorie Smith Goshin & Mary Woods Byrne, Converging Streams of Opportunity for Prison Nursery Programs in the United States, 48 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION
271 (prison nurseries help keep children and mothers together and decrease the likelihood of
children entering foster care).
189
See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION
64 (1976) (observing that in women’s experience, the fetus challenges the inside-outside dualism in western philosophy by being at once introduced from without and nascent from
within, so that “[t]he child that I carry for nine months can be defined neither as me or as
not-me.”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 588–90 (2011).
190
Robert Martone, Scientists Discover Children‘s Cells Living in Mothers’ Brains,
SCI. AM. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientists-discover-chil
drens-cells-living-in-mothers-brain; Nancy Shute, Beyond Birth: A Child’s Cells May Help
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gestating mothers often bond with their babies, creating deep attachments prior
to birth.191 Therefore, there is already a caregiving relationship at birth and separating the mother from the newborn child is already separation of care and
caregiver. Pointing to this pre-birth care relationship need not threaten the right
to abort as personhood of the fetus can still begin at birth, viability, or whatever
standard is preferred. Simply recognizing that gestation creates a care relationship that is different from the genetic connection created by fatherhood does
not pose a threat to feminism or women’s equality. Rather, such recognition
supports women’s unique work and physical connection to fetuses.192 Many
Americans would not want at-risk mothers to abort their babies, nor would
many states permit them to after viability.193 Therefore, in essence, if their babies are removed from them at birth they are essentially made to be forced surrogates for others.
Dwyer complains that there are no studies to indicate that jailhouse nursery
programs are in children’s interests and therefore such programs should never
have been established.194 Although I agree that studies should be conducted, a
dearth of studies cannot result in outlawing such programs. Admittedly, if such
studies could definitively show harm to children, the programs would be hard
to justify. But, as Dwyer admits, there are few studies to draw from and the existing ones were based on overly small samples and yielded inconclusive results.195 On the contrary, precluding such programs simply because studies are
not yet available to show benefits makes innovation impossible.
or Harm the Mother Long After Delivery, SCI. AM. (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fetal-cells-microchimerism (describing a process
of cellular exchange between gestating mother and fetus known as microchimerism); see also Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 439 (2007) (citing
J. Lee Nelson, Microchimerism: Incidental Byproduct of Pregnancy or Active Participant in
Human Health?, 8 TRENDS IN MOLECULAR MED. 109, 109 (2002)).
191
See Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (acknowledging
“that a bond may well develop between a gestational mother and the infant she carried, before, during and immediately after the birth”); MARSHALL H. KLAUS & JOHN H. KENNELL,
PARENT-INFANT BONDING 262–63 (2d ed. 1982); see also ROBIN FOX, REPRODUCTION AND
SUCCESSION: STUDIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY, LAW, AND SOCIETY 71–79 (1993) (discussing the
mother-child “bonding” that occurs during gestation); MARSHALL. H. KLAUS & JOHN. H.
KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 46 (1976); John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean
to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353, 397 (1991) (stating that prenatal bonding between mother and child “is supported
by a great deal of evidence, both scientific and anecdotal”); R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal
Relationships and Nongenetic Surrogates, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 387, 424 (1993).
192
See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering Difference, 26 Vt. L. Rev. 407, 435–37.
193
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (allowing states to prohibit abortion postviability unless the mother’s life or health is in danger); GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES
IN BRIEF, AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (Dec. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
194
Dwyer, supra note 182, at 480.
195
Id.
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As discussed at length above, a component of children’s rights is the right
to parental care. Studies demonstrate that jailhouse nursery programs result in
greater rates of parental care.196 Nurturing parental care certainly benefits children, particularly if such care is supervised and in an educational setting, as is
made possible by being in prison. The benefit of receiving such care and the
benefits of continued mother-child care in a long-term nurturing relationship
have been demonstrated to improve children’s well-being.197 Although Dwyer
argues that the jailhouse programs are justified primarily based on benefits
flowing to the mother, the potential caregiver, such as decreased recidivism for
mothers who participate in the program as well as the benefit of being able to
parent their babies even if in jail,198 studies demonstrate that there is a greater
likelihood of future parental care based on these programs and the way in
which such parental care is preferable for children, as compared to foster
care.199 When compared to foster care options these children are hardly likely
to be worse off.200
In order to discredit prison nurseries, Dwyer compares outcomes for children who are adopted, as opposed to in foster care.201 It is based on this comparison, he argues, that jailhouse nurseries cannot be justified in children’s best
interests as children of adoption are significantly better off.202 But, this is not
the current default system, as children removed from imprisoned mother are not
freed immediately for adoption; rather they are sent to live with foster parents
or kin.
The immediate forced relinquishment of parental rights belonging to nonviolent low sentence offenders cannot be good policy. If mothers choose to relinquish their children, adoption may be the best option, but forced relinquishment is a very different proposition. Many children are born to less than ideal
parents, such as parents who pose a high risk of maltreatment, have mental and
emotional limitations, struggle with prior or current drug addictions, live in unstable housing situations, are indigent, are illegal immigrants, are single parents, and so forth. Indeed, Dwyer himself describes incarcerated mothers as a
196

See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 188, at 276–79.
Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50 FAM. CT.
REV. 228, 234–35 (2012) (citing Mary W. Byrne, Key Findings, Maternal and
Child Outcomes of a Prison Nursery Program, http://nursing.columbia.edu/byrne/pdf
/KeyFindings07_09.pdf) (“The goal of such programs is to foster bonding and attachment
between mothers and their infants, which studies have shown to promote healthier infant development, in addition to reducing recidivism on the part of mothers—a factor that has led
some to promote the programs as a cost-saving measure.” (footnote omitted)).
198
Dwyer, supra note 182, at 480–81 (“The primary motivation for state actors to accede to
advocates’ requests for more programs that bring children into prisons has been the law-andorder and fiscal aims of preventing criminals from reoffending after they are released from
prison.”).
199
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
200
See Dwyer, supra note 182, at 483 n.90.
201
See id. at 480 n.78.
202
See id. at 480.
197
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population with high rates of women with mental problems, drug addictions,
ties to criminal activity, histories of sexual abuse, and undeveloped or weak attachments to their own parents. Moreover many of these women were raised in
foster care, have family members who have been incarcerated, are victims of
domestic violence, and have limited education and work experience.203 Indeed,
there is overlap between the conditions that Dwyer says make prison inmates
at-risk parents and those Dwyer argues make parents high-risk and subject to
potential termination in children’s best interests even when not in prison.204
This threat to the range of American families and their right to raise their children is broad and would alter the way we view parenthood and child-raising, by
giving the government the right to transfer children from poorer, more at-risk
parents to wealthier, majoritarian families. Although proven abuse and neglect
may justify terminating parental rights, questioning parental rights because of
the fear of potential maltreatment based on predetermined risk factors gives
enormous discretion and power to the state.
In lieu of outlawing all such programs as Dwyer suggests, and forcing
adoption to more “optimal” families, more can be done to improve conditions
for these children and their caregivers in the jailhouse setting. For instance, the
stressful and unhealthy environment that Dwyer describes in jailhouse nurseries
might be alleviated by addressing the conditions of such nurseries or providing
that children spend time in outside daycare centers. The conditions of jailhouse
nurseries that Dwyer describes are subject to oversight and perhaps can be
made less stressful than conditions for some children in their legal homes or in
foster care settings. State involvement can be used to improve conditions as
opposed to severing ties with parents because they are in jail for a short period
of time and do not have relatives who can provide adequate care. Because these
mothers are in custody, it is an opportunity to educate and improve their parenting skills as they are literally a captive audience who has nothing but time for
such education, as opposed to other family settings where states are not involved or only involved in crisis management. The costs to the state are not
likely to be more in the long run, given the costs of foster care for children and
jailing repeat offenders, as jailhouse nursery programs may reduce recidivism
rates.205 In Europe, such efforts have apparently been successful overall, are
popular, and regularly considered in line with children’s best interests.206 Al203

See id. at 493–94 (describing challenges of inmates upon reentry and inmates’ characteristics).
204
DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 260 (discussing similar at-risk characteristics relevant to pregnant inmates as compared to those Dwyer would consider “high-risk
parents” and thus subject to judicial oversight in maintaining parenthood rights).
205
See, e.g., Erin Jordan, Prison Nurseries Cut Female Inmates’ Risk of Reoffending, GAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://thegazette.com/2011/01/31
/prison-nurseries-cut-female-inmates-risk-of-reoffending (describing the creation of prison
nursery programs in Nebraska, California, Indiana, and Illinois and discussing how jailhouse
nursery programs will save the state money).
206
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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though the jailhouse may never be an “ideal” setting for child care, it is not
likely to be abusive or neglectful either, and more can be done by the state to
improve conditions, which would reduce stress, violence, and hostility. Although this less stressful, healthier environment, which includes possible outsourcing to ordinary civilian daycare centers, may not be the reality in some or
many of these programs, neither is the forced adoption system that Dwyer sets
up as the alternative to jailhouse nurseries.
Moreover, a few specific inquiries need to be considered in assessing the
appropriateness of jailhouse nursery programs under particular circumstances.
First, the benefits of breastfeeding are considerable and doctors often recommend nursing for at least one year.207 The benefits of having a nursing mother
are not specifically considered in Dwyer’s article and because we are considering the care of very young babies, such consideration seems appropriate. Second, it is necessary to consider the mother’s sentence. If the mother can leave
the jail along with the baby at the end of her term and before the baby is too
old, the possibility of a continuing relationship with an ongoing caregiver must
be weighted more heavily against the unideal setting of the jailhouse. However,
if the baby must ultimately be separated from the caregiver when the child is
older and more aware, these negative effects would weigh against jailhouse
nursery programs.208 Third, once a child is older than eighteen months, the
problem of living in the jailhouse is more concrete and certain limitations seem
prudent—although some programs allow children to stay for up to two or three
years. However, there is still the question of whether the child could be raised
by the mother’s kin or brought to daycare centers in order to keep the family
together when the mother is released, so long as the mother’s release does not
occur too long after the child reaches eighteen months. This depends on availability of kin caregivers, the term of the mother’s sentence, and other factors that
are relevant in considering whether a program that keeps mothers and babies
together in a jailhouse setting may be beneficial.
Being raised in a networked “kin” family may not meet ideal notions of the
nuclear family, but it is not for the state to judge such care networks if they are
not abusive or neglectful. Best interests is more complex than Dwyer’s article
relates, and the three questions above need to be asked and weighed when determining a women’s suitability for a jailhouse nursery program rather than
outlawing these programs altogether. Ongoing caregiver relationships and children’s cultural identity are also important to their well-being.

207

See OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUR
GUIDE TO BREASTFEEDING 15 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.womenshealth.gov
/publications/our-publications/breastfeeding-guide/BreastfeedingGuide-General-English.pdf;
Cindy Harmon-Jones, Duration, Intensity, and Exclusivity of Breastfeeding: Recent Research Confirms the Importance of These Variables, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L (Oct. 14,
2007), http://www.lalecheleague.org/ba/may06.html.
208
Dwyer, supra note 182, at 492–93.
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There is also a clear racial and socioeconomic impact to Dwyer’s arguments. As Dwyer himself forcefully emphasizes, the issue of jailhouse nurseries largely, but not exclusively, concerns minority babies who are living in
jails or who are born to high-risk parents who are under tighter state surveillance. There is something innocent and compelling about wanting to protect
children by relying on foster care and adoption, rather than high-risk mothers
and their families, to care for children. However, it also demonstrates how
powerful the best interests standard can be when wielded by the state. The state
should not be the arbiter of the composition of the perfect family; nor should it
be the predictor of who will be good parents. Caregiving mothers, from pregnancy onward, should be supported to provide needed care for their children.
Children should not be forcefully separated from mothers and then raised in a
costly and overburdened foster system while waiting to be adopted. First and
foremost, caregivers should be supported by programs that seek to make good
parents of those who may not have had a good upbringing and to break the cycle of abuse and neglect. If abuse or neglect nonetheless results, or preliminary
direct evidence can be demonstrated, and is based on more than just indirect
statistical evidence that creates a credible threat of abuse, then the state is left
with no choice but to step in to protect the child.
Best interests should not be used to make sweeping judgments about children of at-risk parents and jailhouse nurseries. Raising children is complicated,
which is why best interests is such a complicated and ambiguous standard, and
why it should not be used to hold caregivers to idealized majoritarian models of
parenting and care by trying to optimize and disqualify at-risk caregivers.
Caregiving attachments must be encouraged, promoted, and supported unless
the state discovers abuse and neglect, and then alternate caregivers should be
found and supported.
These examples are intended to (1) demonstrate the way conflicts between
different categories of children’s interests create tension and ambiguity in determining what is “best” for children; (2) critique state reliance on its own interests and simplistic majoritarian values as a means of avoiding the adequate
consideration of the complex and conflicting interests involved in best interests
analyses, and demonstrate that what usually get minimized are caregiving relationships that do not follow majoritarian idealized norms of the nuclear family;
and (3) demonstrate how caregiver interests are regularly separated from children’s interests, which are adjudicated in an individualized manner that focuses
on the child’s rights and interests independent of ongoing relationships.
This criticism is intended to stem the tide of the use of best interests as the
primary means of promoting children’s interests. In the remainder of the article
I will move beyond analysis and criticism of the best interest standard for advocating on behalf of children and protected children’s rights and begin the
complex work of providing alternative legal standards for protected children’s
rights in the context of custody disputes.
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III. INTEGRATING CAREGIVER RIGHTS WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Determining what is “best” for children is a complex endeavor that cannot
be solved simply by giving power to the state or parents to decide what is best
and calling it “best interests.” Determining what is best is not feasible because
adjudicating children’s rights and interests involves conflicting components
making such an inquiry endlessly complex and subject to bias and manipulation
depending on who has the power to decide. In this part, I refocus the debate in
order to make it more substantive and less binary and antagonistic. As opposed
to isolating children’s interests in a vacuum, I argue that children’s interests
must be examined within the context of the caregiving relationships that support them as an appropriate reflection of their dependency. Although quasi-civil
rights are also relevant for children, what children mostly need are dependency
rights fulfilled by relationships that support them; therefore, such relationships
should be at the center of any inquiry into children’s rights and interests.209 By
focusing on caregivers’ rights and children’s rights while the caregiver relationships are still ongoing, family law can do more to support these essential relationships.
First I will clarify the nature of caregiver rights, and then I will discuss
how to account for caregiver and children’s rights in tandem. Finally, in Part
IV, I will apply this framework in the custodial context.
A. Caregiver Rights and Interests
The previous sections have discussed at length the nature of children’s
rights and interests, and have pointed to the reality that most of children’s interests involve dependency rights—the need for care and nurturing from parents,
caregivers, and the state. I have also demonstrated how the law regularly separates caregiver interests from children’s interests in a variety of contexts and
relies on the best interests standard to make impossible judgments about what is
best for children. Thus, the law regularly sets up a tension between children’s
rights and caregiver rights.
However, as Woodhouse notes, as a matter of logic and sheer practicality,
it is increasingly evident that children’s rights cannot be promoted without advancing caregiver rights: “Policymakers increasingly recognize that a society
cannot care for its children without addressing the needs of their caregivers,
who must either be subsidized at home or given the support they need to participate in the labor market as breadwinners.”210 Caregivers’ choices, needs, inter209

See NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 19.
Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 512; accord EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS
ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 28 (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future of
Feminist Liberalism, in THE SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY 186,
188 (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) (while individualistic liberalism relies
on the “fiction of competent adulthood . . . [r]eal people begin their lives . . . in a state of extreme, asymmetrical dependency, both physical and mental, for anywhere from ten to twenty
210
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ests, and rights affect and are indelibly intertwined with those of their children,
due to the constant care parents must provide. Thus, separating children’s rights
from caregiver rights, and punishing or benefiting one without the other, is infeasible because the other will always be affected. A caregiver’s every choice
will affect her child, particularly a young, dependent child, and any punishment
inflicted upon a caregiver will also affect that child. That which advances or
hinders the interests of a caregiving parent will necessarily affect the interests
of that parent’s child, and vice versa. Attempts to isolate child and caregiver are
not reflective of the interdependent nature of care.211 Such interdependency
compromises the individuality of the caregiver,212 and minimizes the independent needs of the child. However, interdependency is the reality, and recognizing
it is more important when supporting children’s rights than are symbolic gestures protecting the individual liberties of caregivers and children.213
If the needs of caregivers and children are indelibly intertwined, then supporting children means supporting caregivers as well. Children cannot be assured care in isolation. Thus, care must be given by someone who has adequate
financial, emotional, and psychological means to do so.214 It is not enough to
pit parental rights against children’s rights and punish parents who do a lessthan-optimal job—those who are not the “best.” Why would we want to set
these parents up for failure? There are not enough parents to go around for all
the children in need. The foster care system is expensive and overwhelmed.215
years”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 16–23 (2000); John
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 779, 788 (1997);
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 830–31.
211
Sources cited supra note 190.
212
See FINEMAN, supra note 18, at 14; SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 139 (1989); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–2 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman,
The Vulnerable Subject]. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) (discussing how autonomy is impossible for interdependent caregivers and for children in need of care).
213
ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL
EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 94–95 (2003) (“[W]hen we are acting as caregivers, we need not rights that falsely presuppose our autonomy and independence, but rights
that frankly acknowledge our relational reality: when infants, children, or aging parents are
dependent upon us, we are dependent upon others for support and sustenance.”).
214
See, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley, The State of Marriage and the State in Marriage: What
Must Be Done, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 188, 200 (Anita
Bernstein ed., 2006) (“The kinds of measures that would foster autonomy for adults and enable them to provide for children in their care include health insurance, affordable and quality
child care, child allowances of the kind common in Europe, flexible workplace hours, and
paid parental leave for both men and women.”).
215
See Patricia Chamberlain et al., Enhanced Services and Stipends for Foster Parents: Effects on Retention Rates and Outcomes for Children, 71 CHILD WELFARE 387, 387 (1992)
(“Current national trends show that although the number of available foster homes is shrinking, the number of children and adolescents being cared for in the family foster care system
is growing.”); Nolan Rindfleisch et al., Why Foster Parents Continue and Cease to Foster,
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Accordingly, parents who are trying to provide good care need financial and
legal support for their efforts. Society should focus on providing the necessary
support so that caregivers may provide good care.
Progress has been made in supporting dependents and caregivers as a unit
with such developments as the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which
allows a limited amount of unpaid leave to caregivers who want to care for
children or other dependent family members.216 However, such progress is
quite limited and much more needs to be done.217 The United States has lagged
behind other countries in recognizing rights that extend beyond the individual,
relying solely on privacy and individuality to cover children’s needs. As
Woodhouse suggests, “Americans must face the fact that these concepts [of
community and caregiver rights] are considered foundational in most of our
peer nations.”218 The American focus on individual rights in family law and
beyond impedes our ability to provide for dependents and ensure the care that
is so based on interdependency.219 In short, an individualistic perspective impedes promoting children’s interests.
For instance, some feminists argue that women need to be incentivized to
establish themselves in the marketplace and therefore long maternal leave policies become problematic.220 However, child development studies clearly
demonstrate that one-on-one contact during the first year of life is best for children’s development.221 Thus, from a purely children’s rights perspective, it is
clear that caregivers need time off from work to provide that care, and that the
three months unpaid leave provided by FMLA is not enough. Moreover, it is
only to promote a parent’s interest that leave is limited to protect women’s
standing in the workplace.222 Although it might not make sense for a woman to

25 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 5, 6 (1998) (citing documentation by Kamerman and Kahn, as
well as General Accounting Office reports); Susan Rodger et al., Who Is Caring for Our
Most Vulnerable Children? The Motivation to Foster in Child Welfare, 30 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1129, 1130 (2006) (“[T]here is concern that the foster care system may not be
growing at a pace that can provide the necessary capacity to meet this [growing] need.”).
216
Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).
217
See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the
Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2012); Marianne DelPo Kulow, Legislating a Family-Friendly Workplace: Should It Be Done in the United States?, 7 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 88, 93 (2012); Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The
Explosion of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 669, 697 (2008).
218
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 850.
219
Id.
220
Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2, 41, 46–50
(2005).
221
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 830–31.
222
See Lester, supra note 220, at 2 (arguing for paid family leave but arguing against generous, long leave because of its effects on women’s status in the workplace).
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leave her place of employment for a year, it might be best for children.223 From
family leave to economics, education, and health, children’s rights require
providing support for caregiver rights and interests—even if supporting caregivers does not support women’s place in the job market.224
Accordingly, our failure to value care properly and to focus on individualistic rights leads too often to both a conceptual and actual separation of child
and caregiver.225 As Martha Minow concludes, “we need to develop a perspective on children’s rights that refrains from comparing the abilities of children
and adults and instead addresses their mutual needs and connections.”226 We
must move from oppositional accounts of children’s and parental rights and interests—or children’s and state interests—when it comes to dependency rights
and move to a mutually supportive framework that affirmatively supports caregivers and the children for whom they care in a mutually beneficial manner.
Primary caregivers are those parents who do most of the day-to-day care,
such as preparing children for school in the morning and picking children up
after school, arranging for afterschool activities and enrichment, taking children
to doctor’s appointments, and otherwise supervising health and educational
needs.227 Primary caregivers often stay home with children temporarily or even
long term during their “tender years” and often curtail employment opportunities to engage in caregiving work and provide for children’s everyday needs.228
223

This example also distinguishes between woman’s interests and caregiver interests.
Caregiver interests refer to interests associated with those who are caring for children while
woman’s rights may not be associated with such care.
224
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 830–31.
225
Id. at 832–33 (“Our failure to see the child in the ecological context also leads to the
conceptual (and, too often, the actual) separation of the child from her caregivers. A childcentered jurisprudence cannot be truly child-centered if it excludes the concerns of caregivers. In ignoring the needs of caregivers, primarily women, we ignore the needs of the children.” (footnote omitted)).
226
Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 2.
227
See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916–18 (W. Va. 1989); Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981); Richard Neely, Commentary, The Primary Caretaker
Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 180
(1984).
228
See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 37; Joan Williams, Response
Essay, “It’s Snowing Down South”: How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 828 (2002) (“Today, two out of three
mothers are employed less than forty hours a week during the key years of career advancement—and eighty-five percent of women become mothers.”); see also CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 37 (1987) (“Most jobs
in fact require that the person, gender neutral, who is qualified for them will be someone
who is not the primary caretaker of a preschool child.”); DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M.
BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN
WOMEN 147 (1996) (indicating that only 28 percent of women with young children work
full-time outside of the home, while an additional 40 percent work from home and/or parttime); Mary E. O’Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23
NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 501–03 (1988) (noting that the “Human Capital” theory of alimony
focuses on what caretakers have sacrificed by leaving the work force or moving to part-time
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Although it is not always the case, primary caregivers are usually identifiable
even when both parents are pitching in to some extent.229 The easiest way to
identify a primary caregiver is to identify the parent whose work hours are
shorter and who balances care with work on a daily basis.230
Regardless of which parent is the primary caregiver, or whether a parent
can be identified as a primary caregiver at all, most parents are caregivers to
some extent. Primary earners also support and care for children. Third parties
may also be caregivers and may provide more care and support than formal
parents.231 The more care a parent or other caregiver provides, the harder it is to
separate the caregiver from the child when it comes to rights and interests.
However, all caregivers have interests that are intertwined with the rights and
interests of their children reflecting the care they provide.
A caregiver’s rights and interests become intertwined with the child’s life
because of the direct effect of their life choices on the child as well as the constraints that raising children places upon them. Almost anything they do has
some effect on their children, particularly when the children are young and
when they are most dependent. If a primary caregiver is overwhelmed and does
not have necessary support—whether financial or emotional—and therefore
wants to relocate, the interests of the child are interconnected with those of the
caregiver because a caregiver cannot provide good care without feeling stable
and secure herself.232 Caregivers, particularly primary caregivers, often inhibit
their own market work to provide necessary care. As a result, their religious,
geographical, and personal needs, as well as their physical safety, are never
completely separable from their child’s needs and interests.
Critics of such a perspective argue that there is significant danger in seeing
caregiver well-being as intertwined with children’s well-being, as the latter will
suffer when there is focus on the former.233 Children’s needs will be skimmed
over for the sake of parents’ interests, and the focus will be on parental rights
rather than children’s interests. Lawyers and judges, it is argued, would be better off focusing on children than on mixing parental well-being into the inquiry.234 But, this perspective misses the fundamental nature of children’s
needs: to be cared for by parents or other caregivers who will provide support.235 A caregiver’s well-being directly affects and influences his ability to
schedules and misses the feminine choice to engage in certain jobs or professions that have
flexible hours but are not as highly compensated); Donald R. Williams, Women’s Part-Time
Employment: A Gross Flows Analysis, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1995, at 36, 36 (most married mothers still work primarily part-time).
229
See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 2–3; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 2.
230
See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 2.
231
See infra Part IV.
232
See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 3.
233
Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 128–29.
234
Id.
235
See supra Parts I.B., III.A.

15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX

Fall 2014]

4/1/2015 4:06 PM

CAREGIVERS’ RIGHTS

281

provide adequate care, and the benefits of that care, to children. Attempting to
separate these inquiries misses the very nature of care itself. There is no good
way to isolate children from caregiving parents except where the relationship
itself causes enough harm to justify the state interference, and where the interference would actually prevent more harm than it would cause.
Therefore, I argue that creating a system of law and state support that focuses on children’s rights separate and apart from caregivers’ rights is illogical
and bad policy, unless we are in the narrow area of enforcing children’s quasicivil rights against the wishes of parents or when there is abuse and neglect.
And, even when dealing with quasi-civil rights, the nature of the ongoing relationship must be taken into account. In most circumstances and as a matter of
forward-looking state policy, these rights should be viewed as overlapping and
co-supportive, and not as potentially conflicting.
B. Vulnerability Analysis and Relational Rights: Reconceiving Children’s
Rights
In this part, I offer two theoretical frameworks for resolving the potential
tension between caregivers’ rights and children’s rights. As the caregiver and
child are different persons, and rights attach to the individual in the liberal U.S.
tradition, a framework for thinking of these rights in tandem is helpful. First, I
discuss Martha Fineman’s vulnerability framework and then Jennifer
Nedelsky’s perspective on relational rights. Both of these frameworks provide
clear conceptual guidelines for considering how rights can work together as
opposed to in conflict with one another.
1. Vulnerability Analysis: The Vulnerability Inherent in Relationships
In the liberal, individualist tradition that underlies much of modern U.S.
law, rights talk divides and separates rights holders into individual stakeholders
that compete with one another. Here, we are discussing the right to protection
of children, who, as dependents, were once treated as property of parents, and
are in need of care. Separately, we are also discussing the rights of caregivers
who sacrifice market work and personal pleasures to care for these children.
Feminists have fought to secure basic rights for caregivers and value for
the work they do for their children and for society.236 The focus of this article is
the clash of these potential rights. In trying to decipher the relationship between
two competing sets of rights it is helpful to keep in mind that these rights are
exercised against the state and are often exercised to protect each individual’s
vulnerability. However, the quest for state protection of such vulnerability need
not create conflict and tension between stakeholders; rather, the quest univer-
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See, e.g., sources cited supra note 25.
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salizes the struggles we face in pursuit of justice.237 Martha Fineman argues
that just as individualism and the separation of rights among persons is a universal theory, so should it be a universal theory that liberal individualism does
not provide sufficient support to vulnerable parties.238 Both children and caregivers have been underprivileged and underrepresented groups and it seems unfortunate to have to pit their rights against each other and choose.239 As Fineman suggests, we should move away from differentiation and focus instead on
“the relationship and complementary shared responsibilities of the individual,
the state, and societal institutions in regard to responding to the realities of the
human condition.”240
From this perspective, children and caregivers share the vulnerability of the
human condition. Because children depend on caregivers who in turn are deeply intertwined with their children in facilitating their well-being, it makes sense
to protect these vulnerabilities in a complementary, shared fashion that is focused on relationships. These relationships should not be viewed as deviant but
as the focus of state support.241 Unlike rights talk that pits the rights of one side
against the rights of the other and emphasizes obligations and duties in response to rights and interests, a focus on vulnerability instead emphasizes the
universality of the vulnerable condition that the state must support in a holistic—as opposed to a necessarily divisible—manner. Thereby, Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory provides a framework for resolving the tension between the competing rights introduced in this article.242
2. Relational Rights and Interests: Supporting Individuals Within
Relationships
Although the theory of universal vulnerability that Fineman introduces
demands that we start with the premise of our universal need for state assistance, rights and rights talk are still a fundamental and compelling tool for delineating what the state must do for its citizenry and the ways in which the state
must not interfere with its citizenry depending on whether we are dealing with
a positive right under the law to state action or a right to freedom from state interference. Focus on rights is unlikely to be easily abandoned in favor of focus
on vulnerability. Another way to resolve the tension between caregiver rights
and children’s rights is to focus on relational rights as opposed to individualis-

237

See Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13
NEV. L.J. 619, 619–20 (2013).
238
Id. at 620.
239
See Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 627, 647–48 (1987). (arguing that when caregiver and children’s rights conflict,
the more vulnerable party’s rights should prevail—usually children).
240
Fineman, supra note 237, at 636.
241
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 212, at 1, 3–4, 8.
242
Id.
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tic rights.243 Using the theory of relational rights has the benefit of remaining in
the rights talk conversation as opposed to beginning with the demand for social
welfare from the state due to universal vulnerability. However, the outcome of
the need to focus on dependence and relationships is similar.
The relational perspective on children’s rights is distinct from the right to
relationships and from relationship rights, which are more comparable to group
rights. The right to relationships is still an individualistic right that can attach to
both individual children and adults. It is the right of the individual to have a relationship with another person, such as a caregiver.244 The relational perspective on rights is also not about rights that belong to a relationship. Relational
rights do not protect two individuals together. Rather, the rights attach to the
individuals, but the duty to the individual comes in the form of support for the
relationship. Relational rights are about the responsibility of the state to protect
and support relationships in order to protect and support individual interdependent children and caregivers.245 That the rights attach to individuals and
flow to relationships does not mean the individuals’ rights are compromised.
Due to their interdependency, in most circumstances, the only way to effectively support and protect these individuals is through their relationships.
The basic premise behind relational rights is that when it comes to children’s rights, instead of trying to decipher some identifiable notion of best interests, the focus of children’s advocacy and the corresponding duties placed on
the state should be on setting preconditions for healthy and beneficial relationships that children need.246 As Martha Minow inquires, in suggesting relational
rights as the premise for children’s rights, “[w]hat legal rules governing child
custody, education, and child support would promote settings where children
thrive? . . . [W]hat rules would promote adults’ abilities to create these settings?”247 Children’s advocacy should be viewed through the lens of interdependent relationships because such interdependent relationships are at the heart
of what it means to meet the needs of children and caregivers. It is this complex
perspective on families—individuals within an interdependent community—
that best describes the relational perspective on children’s rights I am advancing: “A conception of relational rights and responsibilities . . . would not regard
243

Minow & Shanley, supra note 25, at 23; see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1825–39 (1998) (discussion
of relational rights and duties in tort law); C. Harry Hui, Measurement of IndividualismCollectivism, 22 J. RES. PERSONALITY 17, 17–19 (1988); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1230, 1278 (1998).
244
See, e.g., Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, supra note 26, 2168, 2172–73 (discussing the right of children to have caregiving relationships due to their developmental
needs); see also DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 84 (arguing for the rights
of children to have relationships with caregivers).
245
See supra notes 36–61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way rights create
duties upon the state.
246
Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 23.
247
Id.
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‘rights’ as belonging to individuals and arising from the imperative of selfpreservation, but rather would view rights as claims grounded in and arising
from human relationships of varying degrees of intimacy, what Kenneth Karst
has called ‘intimate associations.’ ”248
This perspective on rights as relational has been advocated broadly by Jennifer Nedelsky, who argues for a relational approach to organizing our collective lives in a constitutive manner and to approach legal questions from the
starting assumption that our human selves are in interaction with others.249 She
sharply criticizes all individualistic accounts of rights and autonomy as identities and capacities, which, she argues, are not comprehensible in isolation from
their relationships.250 Therefore, from a relational perspective it is logical and
sensible to consider children’s rights in conjunction with caregiver rights.
IV. DOCTRINAL REUNIFICATION OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS WITH CAREGIVER
RIGHTS IN THE LAW OF CUSTODY
The question is therefore how, in practice, to balance the different components of children’s rights—parental privacy, quasi-civil rights, and dependency
rights provided by the state—with caregiver rights, when the goal is to focus on
the supportive relationships that children need. And, importantly, how to incorporate the state and legislature in regulating and shaping this need for care.
Broadly, civil rights are more straightforward to enforce in the liberal, individualistic tradition, but even such rights should be enforced keeping in mind the
relationship in which they will continue to be supported. Yet, the need for care
and the tension between state and parental caregivers in providing such care is
more complex when the law focuses on individuals and not relationships. The
need for care and the existence within interdependent frameworks makes the
dominant, individualistic, liberty-based perspective on rights an impossible fit
for children.
The child, an individual with his own rights and interests, is also an indelible part of a relationship with his parents, and when parents fail, the child is
dependent on the state. So too, the caregiver, an adult with rights and interests
of her own, is also an indelible part of a dependency relationship when it comes
to caring for a child. The interdependency, for both the caring parent and the
child, is not only physical, but emotional. Physically, a caregiver must provide
safety, shelter, and care for the dependent child. Emotionally, caregivers’ own
choices are often intertwined not only with their own needs, but also with the
needs of their children. Choices that might appear to be selfish could result in
more emotional stability for a parent, which would improve parenting. Separat248

Minow & Shanley, supra note 25, at 23 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980)); see Bartlett, supra note 25, at 315 (“We
may also want to take account of the different degrees of relationship that have been
formed.”).
249
NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 55.
250
Id. at 121.
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ing out caregiver choices that are just for the caregiver’s sake and those that are
for children is complex and may be impossible. This symbiotic relationship is
central to parenthood both from a normative and descriptive perspective.
The answer lies in shifting from an oppositional rights discourse to delineating legal principles that govern interactions between these individuals and
their rights in a manner that best supports their interdependent relationships.
Thus, the key is not to decide whose interests trump whose, but rather to look
for guiding principles that can strike a balance between the potentially conflicting and competing concerns.251 I will provide some concrete examples of how a
reunited perspective on care and caregiver would affect and alter the law of
child custody. Most essentially, the law should reject the use of the best interests standard to the greatest extent possible. Moreover, substantively, the law
would look to support caregivers along with children. The law should focus on
nurturing relationships as opposed to focusing on the division between them.
A. Supporting a Variety of Care Relationships
Caregivers are not always parents. Children receive their care from a variety of sources. Although parents are still the primary providers of care, care is
multifaceted and this article’s focus is on caregivers, not on parents alone.
Moreover, the focus on care is not an absolute measure. There is a variety of
levels of care, and these different levels can be recognized for what they are
and supported in degrees as opposed to absolute rights. A relational perspective
should support a variety of forms of relationships from a variety of care providers.252
Third parties, such as grandparents, step-parents, same-sex partners, and
others who are not formal parents, increasingly seek custodial rights or visitation with children based on their caregiving activities.253 I have argued for
providing parental status and rights to functional third-party caregivers because
such status makes sense for children, caregivers, and parents.254 These functional caregivers provide significant care over a long period of time that is sufficient to meet threshold requirements for becoming a functional parent.255
251

Contra Rutherford, supra note 239, at 647. Jane Rutherford has argued for support for
family rights alongside individual rights, and when the rights of individuals in the family
conflict—husband’s rights with a wife’s or children’s with their parents—the weaker and
more vulnerable party’s rights should prevail. Id. The focus of such a “rule” is on the nature
of the parties individually and not on the functioning of the relationship and thus does not
comply with the framework of relational rights that I promote. The rule to favor weaker parties may work as between men and women but not as between parents and children; this theory does not sufficiently appreciate interdependency of parent and child, as the weaker party—the child—is not necessarily poised to express or to have his will carried out without
support from a parent.
252
See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
253
See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
254
See generally Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13.
255
Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 442–43.
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Children benefit from third-party care and parents do as well.256 Legal status
and rights benefit functional parents by giving recognition and value to the care
or financial support they provide.257 From a relational perspective, as opposed
to an individualistic rights perspective, there is less of a focus on separating out
rights and interests and pitting the rights of different caregivers against each
other. The focus is on supporting these relationships, whether formal and biological or functional and care-based.
However, functional parenting is different in practice and in theory from
formal parenting. There are significant benefits to the flexible and diverse manner in which such relationships develop and meet the needs of children.258
Moreover, there are many different kinds of people that might qualify as functional caregivers by providing for the needs of children. Functional relations are
not as stable, predictable, identifiable, or easily assignable as formal parenting
relationships.259 They also create a potential multiplicity of claims that can upset the stable, private lives of children through state and court intervention.260
Thus, for the sake of the children who are the primary beneficiaries of functional caregivers, but also in acknowledgement of the different potential concerns involved, we should heed the benefits of functional parenthood without
equating it to formal parenthood.261
Functional caregivers need status and recognition to best care for children,
to maintain relationships despite conflicts with parents, and to facilitate childcare that is supported by formal parents.262 For instance, functional parents
need status in order to obtain authority for health care decisions and to act as
legal guardians.263 Functional parents should not be disposed of when primary
caregivers disagree with them if their attachments are supporting the children.
On the other hand, it also makes sense to support these caregiving relationships
in a way that not only facilitates their continuity and stability but also minimizes tension with formal parents.264 Power struggles between formal and functional caregivers can create conflict between parental figures that has been
demonstrated to be a primary risk factor in undermining children’s wellbeing.265 Differentiation and a clear demarcation of obligations and responsibility for final decisions can give primary caretakers the support they need without
challenging their primary parental status.266 A differentiated functional parent
256

Id. at 439–41.
Id. at 441.
258
Id. at 455–61.
259
Id. at 455, 461–66.
260
Id. at 463.
261
Id. at 454–55.
262
Id. at 441.
263
Id. at 439–40.
264
Id. at 461–62.
265
Id. at 466; see infra note 297 and accompanying text for studies that demonstrate that
familial conflict harms children.
266
Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 466.
257
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status would not override an ongoing formal parenthood relationship, but could
also support secondary relationships with functional caregivers by providing
rights to visitation or other subsets of parental rights even if a parent objects.267
Grandparents and other biological kin, however, including biological birth
parents post-adoption, do not necessarily meet the threshold minimum requirements for determining functional parenthood and thus would not be entitled to
functional parent status.268 They may be functional parents, based on the level
of functional care they provide, or they may simply be loving grandparents and
not substitute parents.269 Still, biological kin may seek state assistance from
courts in obtaining access to grandchildren, often due to death of their child.270
In Troxel v. Granville, the Court dealt squarely with the potential conflict between parent, child, and state.271 Grandparents sought visitation with their
grandchildren through state interference because the grandchildren’s mother
was not providing them with the access they desired after their son’s death.272
The trial court held that it was in the best interests of the children to continue
the relationship with their grandparents, as provided by state statute, as the relationship appeared to have a positive impact on their lives.273 However, the Supreme Court held that any such “best interests” reasoning was a violation of parental privacy rights.274 Instead, greater weight should be given to the fact that
parents can determine what is in their child’s best interests.275 The case was
sent back to the appellate court and the lower courts have had a dizzying time
figuring out what the Supreme Court judgment meant and what standards might
be considered constitutional.276
Interpreting Troxel from a relational rights perspective, there are two issues
that need to be considered. First, best interests should already include such special considerations of parental prerogatives and liberties because low tension
and parental privacy are part of what helps children thrive.277 It is usually not in
the best interests of children for the state to force a relationship that parents object to and that creates tension in the home. If the Supreme Court is saying that

267

Id. at 467.
Cf. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, supra note 26 (arguing for rights to caregiving relationships but only when caregivers are “primary”).
269
Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 442–43.
270
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60–61 (2000).
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Id.
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Id.
273
Id. at 61–63.
274
Id. at 72–73.
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Id. at 72.
276
See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 337, 396–401 (2002); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the Courts’ Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation
Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 14, 15 (2003).
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See supra Parts I.B, II.A.
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parental prerogatives merit extra weight due to parental rights, the question becomes how much weight?
Second, focus should be given to the effect of enforcing the relationship on
the interaction between child and parent, child and grandparent, and parent and
grandparent. As long as the primary caregiver is still acting as primary, if the
care provided by the grandparent is important to the child’s well-being, such
visitation should be continued despite parental objections in recognition of the
relational principle of supporting different forms and degrees of relationships.
However, if the grandparent relationship has not been important in providing
care, and there is deep-seated, unresolvable tension between grandparent and
parent that will cause harm to the primary caregiving relationship, then grandparent interaction would not be worth supporting at the cost of harming the relationship with formal parents.
This same analysis could apply in providing birth parents with access to
children post-adoption, if not already provided for by agreement, in order to
support children’s relationships with parents, even if adoption is the best option
for the primary caregiving relationship.278 Particularly with regard to older
children, birth parents’ relationships with adopted children may be significant
and should not be discarded to the detriment of the children. Attachment from
past caregiving is the primary indicator of the need to support such ongoing, yet
differentiated care relationships, such as in the case of post-adoption contact,279
relationships with long-term foster parents, or relationships with illegal immigrant parents. Other factors may be relevant as well; for instance, biological
and cultural connections to a child can create a strong desire to care and provide for a child. Such cultural and biological affinities should be encouraged, as
is the case for Native American children and children born to inmates, so as to
foster these needed caregiving relations and cultural identities. If primary formal parents are given defined rights including primary physical custody, the
vision is for other attached caregivers, whether due to past care, biological affinity, or cultural kin-ties, to also be given an opportunity to have a caregiving
relationship with a child to that child’s benefit. Such secondary caregivers may
interfere with the exclusive, binary parental relationship envisioned in the nuclear family, but for many children such care networks can be extremely beneficial, and thus parental rights should be weakened for the sake of these relationships. From a relational perspective a child can benefit from a myriad of
connections both biological and cultural as well as based on caregiving attachments.
In sum, opening up the network of care to other committed long-term caregivers makes sense from a child-focused, relational perspective when children
benefit from such care.280 If, however, the secondary relationship cannot be
278

See supra Part II.B.3.
See generally Appell, supra note 168, at 102–36 (discussing the importance of relationships between children and biological kin post-adoption).
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sustained in parallel to the primary relationship, this reality would have to be
taken into account and likely discontinued unless the care relationship is significant enough to rise to the level of functional parent, in which case, allowing
such a relationship despite formal parental objections would be more imperative. However, I believe that a societal and legal embrace of the reality of networked care, along with clear delineations of power and control, can usually
avoid power struggles and allow adults to provide for multiple care relationships that are beneficial to children.
B. Caregiver Presumptions
When two fit parents both want custody of a child, the custody dispute is
bound to be antagonistic and difficult.281 The situation often involves two loving parents who are angry with each other and longing to maintain close relationships with their children. Thus, custody disputes can be fierce and the ensuing conflict is sure to be detrimental to the children involved.282 Too often,
children are used as pawns in custody disputes and do not have enough opportunity to speak their minds. Moreover, custody disputes can be incredibly expensive, involving complex and conflicting evidence and testimony.283 Ultimately, it is incredibly hard to optimize between two loving parents even if
they have different parenting styles. The best interests standard, which is both
broad and inherently at tension with itself due to incorporation of both the benefits of parental privacy and the benefits of state intervention, gives little if any
guidance to making determinations between two fit parents.
Between two formal parents, the relational perspective I am describing argues for supporting a variety of degrees and types of caregiving relationships.
Thus, well-defined, differentiated statuses that minimize tension and conflict
between parental figures, which have been demonstrated to be a primary factor
in undermining children’s well-being,284 could also apply to primary and secondary caregivers in a fashion similar to that suggested for functional caregivers and secondary caregivers, like grandparents. As described above, a variety
of intimate relationships can be recognized, but differences should also be taken into account in allocating rights and responsibilities. In the context of custody disputes between two formal fit parents, this means that, absent an agreement to parent jointly, primary and secondary custodians should be clearly
281

See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the best interests standard used in custody disputes
between fit parents.
282
See, e.g., ROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT 1–4
(2d ed. 1999); Yongmin Sun, Family Environment and Adolescents’ Well-Being Before and
After Parents’ Marital Disruption: A Longitudinal Analysis, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 697,
698 (2001).
283
See supra Part II.A.
284
See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 47–52 (discussing different
approaches to custody determinations and analyzing their effects on tension and conflict between parental figures).
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delineated, with distinguishable rights and responsibilities, but that both relationships should be sustained and supported in a rigorous manner.
In a previous article, I advocated for the primary caretaker standard in custody decisions between two fit parents.285 This standard is only applicable when
a primary caretaker can be identified. However, despite contentious litigation
on the matter, and conflicting studies, many estimate that in most cases a primary caretaker can be identified.286 The primary caretaker can be ascertained
by affirmative day-to-day activities as well as limited participation in the work
place.287 When such a caretaker can be identified, he or she should have presumptive custody that can be rebutted by agreement to share custody or by
demonstrating significant harm to the child. Primary custody should constitute
anywhere from sixty to eighty percent of physical custody of a child, depending
on agreement and living situations of the parents, and leaving substantial visitation for a secondary caregiver.288 Although this suggestion for a presumption
remains unpopular, and states instead rely heavily on the best interests standard, I make this argument again from a child-centered relational perspective. If
not for the sake of caregivers, then perhaps from the perspective of children
such a presumption can gain more support.
I argue for this presumption for several reasons. First, I believe that it is
best for children to live with primary caregivers because of the validity of the
attachment theory developed by Goldstein, Solnit, and Freund.289 Children
bond to primary caregivers and need continuation of these important relationships. Second, I believe that unless parents can work together in a consistent
and low-conflict manner, it is best for children that there is a primary custodian
285

See id. at 47–56.
See id. at 2 & n.3; see also CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND
THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 4–5 (2010).
287
See Price v. Price, 611 N.W.2d 425, 430–36 (S.D. 2000) (“The primary caretaker can be
identified by determining which parent invested predominant time, care and consistency in
raising the child.” (internal quotation markes omitted)); Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 2.
288
Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the
Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting, 25 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 347, 353 (2005).
289
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986); see LauferUkeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 48; see also, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams,
203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing expert testimony on the attachment
theory); David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916–17 (W. Va. 1989) (“Substantial research has confirmed that young children, as a result of intimate interaction, form a unique
bond with their primary caretaker. This unique attachment to a primary caretaker is an essential cornerstone of a child’s sense of security and healthy emotional development. . . . Thus,
the young child’s welfare can be best served by preserving the child’s relationship with the
primary caretaker parent.”); Chambers, supra note 134, at 530 (“The original bond of the
child with the primary caretaker is believed to have an important continuing effect on the
child’s ability to pass through each stage with success”); Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the
Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 799 (1985) (“The principal attachment figure is that person who is most responsive to the child’s signals of biological
needs and who initiates and maintains social interactions with the child.”).
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and decision maker to resolve conflicts and make important decisions.290 Third,
I believe that there is a tendency for one parent to do more of the work than the
other in raising children, and despite agreements made in court, one parent—
the primary caregiver prior to the divorce—will still do most of the caregiving,
so that parent will need the child support that primary custody involves.291 Finally, as between two fit parents, I believe that it is fair to give the presumption
to the primary caregiver to properly value the caregiving work he or she has
provided.292 Just as the primary earner keeps the value of this earning potential
for his or her life after divorce, so too would the primary caregiver retain a benefit for the value of the care work that he or she has provided.293 Although primary earner support is also essential and should continue to be essential in the
parenting relationship, it is also different in kind than caregiving and should be
treated as such.
All these rationales support children’s rights and interests, both directly
and indirectly. Giving a primary caregiver presumptive weight when it comes
to custody does not give her rights at the detriment of her children. From a relational perspective, the act of giving care needs to be supported because of the
relational nature of children’s rights. Caregiving should be valued and supported because it is what children need and thus the parents who provide the support to children should be supported as well.294 This will both reward and incentivize caregivers who provide needed care. Attempts to isolate the interests
of the child from caretakers fail to appreciate the interdependent nature of caregiver and child well-being.295 Supporting care supports the children who are
dependent upon caregiving relationships. Primary earners also have relationships with children that should be supported but, as they are different in nature,
their differences should be taken into account. Based more on financial support
than physical support, the relationship must be continued but need not depend
on the same amount of constant physical interaction.
In situations where parents are substantively splitting care work and a primary caregiver cannot be identified, the presumption does not help and efforts
to find a primary caretaker should not be too rigorous. When the caregiving
functions are equal or near equal, it is not worth fighting about in court as litigation will only increase tension and joint caregiving work should be incentiv290

Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 54–55.
Id. at 53.
292
Id. at 47–49.
293
Id. at 58–59.
294
See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 192 (1992); Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the
Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 450–51 (1990);
discussion supra Parts IIIA–B.
295
See Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 117–18 (arguing that preferring a primary caretaker in custody disputes will harm the interests of children unless it can
be found that it is in children’s best interests to remain with primary caretakers).
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ized and supported. If a joint caregiving arrangement can be continued after divorce or by non-married parents by agreement of cooperating adults, it should
be fully supported. However, if there is significant conflict and caregivers cannot work cooperatively, one parent has to be chosen and these are clearly the
hardest cases to decide. Studies demonstrate that the two variables most important to the well-being of children are: (1) low levels of conflict between parental figures, and (2) financial stability.296 Clearly, fighting, uncooperative
parents cannot easily “share” the raising of children.297 In order to minimize
tension and ongoing conflict to which a child may be exposed in a manner that
can be harmful, one parent should be chosen as primary legal custodian, although it should be ensured that the secondary custodian maintains a relationship with the child. The choice should not be made by “best interests,” but by
focus on the nature and strength of the relationship between the child and each
parent. In addition, in such cases, particularly for older children, child’s preferences should weigh heavily in determining the strength of the relationship and
who should be preferred for custody.
Once a primary custodian is chosen, liberal visitation should be provided,
maximizing the relationship between the children and the secondary custodian.
Additionally, once awards are made in the rare cases where such custody arrangements are not made by agreement, parties can then sit down and rework
the arrangement, because bargaining will be made easier by the certainty of a
legal decision. Both primary and secondary relationships should be stressed as
crucial to the child’s well-being. The imposition of some hierarchy supports
working relationships, as there is a clear and final decision maker and demar296

Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 207, 238–39 (2010) (discussing and citing studies of how exposure to high levels of
conflict and stress negatively impacts children); see E. Mavis Hetherington, Should We Stay
Together for the Sake of the Children, in COPING WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND
REMARRIAGE: A RISK AND RESILIENCY PERSPECTIVE, 93, 93–116 (E. Mavis Hetherington
ed.,1999); Paul. R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children:
A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 26, 38 (1991) (“The [family conflict] perspective assumes that divorce affects children primarily because of the conflict that occurs between
parents before and during the separation period. . . . [Meta-analysis] results strongly support
a conflict perspective; not only were children in high-conflict intact families considerably
worse off than children in low-conflict intact families, but they also exhibited lower levels of
well-being than did children in divorced families.”); Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and
Visitation Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases: Legal Trends, Risk Factors, and Safety
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http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.php?doc_id=1134 (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (“Enthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was fueled by studies
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from her [most recent] review of research that ‘highly conflictual parents’ (not necessarily
violent) had a poor prognosis for becoming cooperative parents,” and “[t]here is increasing
evidence, however, that children of divorce have more problems because of the conflict between the parents before the divorce and not because of the divorce itself.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 54–56.
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cated rights and responsibilities. However, secondary caregivers are important
and need to be given rights to significant visitation and consultation regarding
legal decision making for major life decisions.
C. Modification and Relocation
Modification and relocation cases are different than initial custody cases
because they are brought after an initial award, usually due to some change in
circumstances. The petitioning parent is requesting that the court move a child
from the primary custody of one fit parent to the primary custody of the other
fit parent. Because a custody agreement will likely have already been made,
modification and relocation decisions can cause great upheaval to a child if custody is transferred.298
The typical standard in modification cases is that there must be significant
change of circumstances that justifies a change in custody in the child’s best
interests.299 In relocation cases, the issue is that the primary custodian wants to
leave town and this change is usually presumed to be significant. Thus, the traditional inquiry is whether the relocation is done in bad faith and will cause
significant harm to the child, and the courts will allow the custodial parent
freedom of movement in most circumstances where a good faith reason for
moving is proffered by the primary custodian.300
A relational perspective must consider two factors. First, it is important to
cement the secondary custodian’s relationship with a child. A secondary caregiver, if fit, should have a protected and significant relationship with the child.
Although I support recognition of the primary caretaker, the secondary status
should also be protected as well. The relational perspective I describe supports
hierarchy and assignment of roles to limit conflict and tension caused by power
struggles and uncertainty in a manner that still allows both caregivers to have a
substantive relationship with a child.
298

See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 866 (1997); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The
Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 123–24
(1997).
299
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.110(a) (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-204(c)
(West Supp. 2014) (“A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care,
custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification
would be in the best interests of the children . . . .”); JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 948
(6th ed. 2012).
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See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (2013) (granting the custodial parent the right to
change residence, unless it would negatively affect the rights or welfare of the child); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(d) (West Supp. 2014) (as long as a good faith reason is proffered by
the custodial parent, the opposing parent must demonstrate harm to prevent the move with
the child); Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 598 A.2d 482, 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Morgan v.
Morgan, 12 A.3d 192, 200 (N.J. 2011) (petitioner seeking relocation must prove “a good
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note 107 § 2.17(4)(a)(ii) (providing a list of good faith reasons for a parent’s move).
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Second, caregiver actions should not be modeled or judged on an ideal
“best interests” optimization scale. Some parental choices are based solely on
what parents think is best for their children, while others, of course, are more
selfish.301 Still, even when parents are not making choices solely for the sake of
children, their children’s needs may be considered to some extent. Even parental liberty rights that seem directly at odds with a child’s interests must be
judged in the context of a relationship. When parental choices seem suboptimal, if they do not cause significant harm to children they should not affect
custody, because parental well-being is inseparably connected to the quality of
care parents are able to provide and the stability of the parental home.302 Judging and interfering with those choices can negatively affect the care provided.
For instance, choosing a non-family-friendly car or going out late with friends
instead of being home every night with children may seem like selfish choices
to be held against a parent. However, parental well-being and freedom is an
important contributor to the provision of adequate care, and such choices
should not be examined too harshly. Parents need support for their care, not intense scrutiny and judgment. Punishing parents for suboptimal choices that do
not cause significant harm isolates and separates the children from the caregiver and ultimately harms ongoing relationships. Indeed, trying to determine who
is at fault or condemning certain parental choices as less than the “best” for a
child’s well-being mirrors a fault system of divorce. In many ways, the parent
who chooses to leave or abandon the marriage can be argued to have done the
most harm to the child. Yet, we have abandoned fault in divorce because it impacts child custody in a contentious and potentially harmful manner.303 Policies
can and should be put into place to educate, inform, and encourage parents in a
way that advances children’s interests,304 but we should be cautious about judging, punishing, and interfering with parental choices that do not amount to
abuse or neglect, because this impacts ongoing care relationships by creating
hostility and tension.
Recent legislation and case law have moved the law in modification and relocation cases closer to a renewed best interests analysis by purportedly focusing on the rights of the child and thus necessitating such renewed childcentered inquiries.305 However, this move towards best interests is not good for
301

Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 129–34.
See supra Part III.
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See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 296, at 231–32.
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See Helen M. Alvaré, Response, A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen’s Regulating
Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 8, 11 (2012)
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not coerce); Shelley Kierstead, Parent Education Programs in Family Courts: Balancing
Autonomy & State Intervention, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 140, 141–43 (2011).
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See ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2011) (rebuttable presumption that relocating is not in the
best interest of the child); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1) (West 2013) (not requiring a finding of changed circumstances if original custody decree was a matter of stipulation and not
litigation as are most custody arrangements);MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West 2006) (ne302
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children. There is not only indeterminacy in the original custody decision but
indeterminacy that can potentially be multiplied each time the non-custodial
parent wants to challenge the judgment.306 In modification cases, the relational
rights theory and the two factors discussed above would argue for keeping the
standard for modification high in cases of two fit parents, certainly only allowing for changes in primary custody where significant harm can be demonstrated
by the petitioner and this harm stems from the primary caregiving relationship.
To end the primary caregiving relationship altogether, abuse or neglect must be
proven. As both relationships should be considered significant, a high threshold
would have to be met to alter the balance of time between two fit caregivers.
The two factors described above from the relational perspective—
promotion of secondary care relationships and avoidance of judging and punishing caregiver choices—would seem to contradict each other in the case of
relocation. Moving away from a secondary custodian will harm and affect the
nature of that important secondary caregiving relationship, particularly if the
secondary caregiver is involved in the day-to-day care of the child. However,
removing custody from a parent who wants to relocate seems to punish caregivers for their choices in a manner that isolates the caregiver from the care he
or she provides. In such cases, it should first be determined by the court whether the secondary custodian can retain the same level and depth of caregiving on
an alternative schedule that perhaps gives the secondary caregiver more time in
the summer and vacations. If so, relocation should be allowed if significant
change can be avoided, and caregiver choices should be respected to the extent
possible. Second, the judge should examine whether the relocation would cause
significant harm to the child. A typical relocation should not cause significant
harm to the child, as many people move, but if there has been instability in the
child’s life due to many moves over the course of a child’s lifetime, it would be
necessary to modify the custody arrangement so as to allow the child to remain
with the parent who is not relocating.
If neither of the two inquiries delineated above provides clear resolution of
the issue, and the relocation will significantly diminish the relationship with the
secondary custodian and the child, the primary custodian should be encouraged
to refrain from relocation and perhaps financial adjustments can be ordered by
the court to cure the need for relocation. The primary custodian should not be
threatened with removal of the children, as in most cases she would rather retain custody than move. The court also cannot deny her the right to move; but,
the court can refuse to alter the visitation schedule that sustains the secondary
custodian’s relationship with the child, leaving it to the parents to negotiate a
different schedule in order to make the relocation possible for the custodial par-

cessitating a court order or consent from the other parent so that a custodial parent may relocate with their children).
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See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2003, 2025 (2014).
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ent. In caring for children, parents must be able to come to such arrangements
and usually do.
CONCLUSION
Focusing on children’s needs is of the utmost importance in modern family
law. Nothing I have written in this article is intended to detract from its importance. All three kinds of children’s rights and interests I have addressed
need protection and consideration. However, the only way to make headway in
advancing children’s advocacy is to move away from opposition and individualism which have become inherent in best interest inquiries and focus instead
on the actual interdependency and relationships that are so important for children. This change in focus will not weaken children’s rights; it will only advance them more effectively and in a manner that is easier for society to embrace and which better reflects reality. This article provides a new relational
framework for analyzing children’s rights and interests in a manner that allows
us to consider traditional family law doctrines, like the primary caregiver doctrine, through a new child-based relations lens. For the most part, children do
not need the right to be left alone, nor do they need the state to interfere in relationships with family members. Indeed, it is the fear of such liberty rights that
makes embracing children’s rights so difficult. Rather, what children need from
the state is more support of the relationships and care that best serves them as
members of a life-sustaining relationship. Such support can create a seismic
shift in policy initiatives and family law, and beyond that will ultimately increase support of relationships for the sake of children and in the name of children’s rights.

